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The goal of this study is to analyze the underlying reasons of the problems of SOEs and 
find an approach to improve efficiency. I categorize the problems into government over-
interference and principal-agent problem. I discuss the need of privatization versus other 
options such as restructuring, commercialization and corporatization. I argue 
privatization is a necessity for its sustainability and comprehensive results that cannot be 
obtained by other means. By describing privatization as a process of corporate 
governance change, I develop a framework of corporate governance on ownership, 
control and incentive. As China SOE reform is an exploratory test in the world, providing 
a role model to many other transitional economies, I study how privatization suits 
China’s case by hypotheses testing approach.  
  
I use Mann-Whitney test and Kruskal-Wallis test based on the data of listed companies in 
China’s Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 1995 and 
1998. I want to explore whether the proportion of state shareholding, a kind of partial 
divestiture is related to the difference of Corporate Governance among enterprise groups 
and whether the difference of corporate governance is related to the difference of firms’ 
performance.  
 
I find the degree of privatization has sweepingly significant effects on ownership 
concentration and ownership structure; it has comprehensive influence on a firm’s control 
and incentive system as well. I also find a lot of corporate governance indicators are 
related to companies’ performance. 
 
Policy implications of the study include: state shares should be further withdrawn from 
certain industries. Along with the withdrawing of state shares, both the decrease of 
ownership concentration and the increase of diversification of the biggest shareholders 
should be promoted. Insider control should be constrained and incentive mechanisms 
should be reformed.   
 
 
Chapter one: Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation of the study 
The global wave of privatization started from the 1980’s, governments such as Britain, 
France, Austria and New Zealand have progressively reduced their engagements in state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Privatization was also treated as a fundamental policy element 
of transition economies such as Czech, Poland and Hungary. This wave was stirred up by 
the overwhelming claims that SOEs had no efficiency. The strategic operational weakness 
in the SOE model was fiercely attacked: 1 obscure objectives, poor management, weak 
monitoring and ineffective incentives were claimed as the inborn characteristics of SOEs, 
and it was argued they did not appear to serve the public interest better than private firms 
did. (e.g. Shielfer & Vishny, 1997) Nevertheless, SOEs’ losses resulted in huge drains on 
their countries’ treasuries. Of all the different privatization cases, the SOE reform in China 
is conspicuous not only because of its importance to China’s overall economic reform, but 
also because of its uniqueness, which is a good reference for the rest of the transition 
economies. 
 
In the transition from Central Planned Economy to a Market Economy in China, the 
profitability of SOEs has been deteriorating, despite the big reform efforts the government 
has done. Between 1988 and 1996, the share of loss-making industrial SOEs nationwide 
increased from 12% to 38%. In 1996 the state sector lost 3 billion yuan, amounting to 1.3 
percent of GDP. One third of the state-owned properties were bad properties and it was 
                                                          





the first time since 1949 that the state ended the year in a deficit. (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 1997) The ultimate motivation of this study is to analyze SOEs’ underlying 
problems and to seek possible solutions. 
 
Privatization has been largely advocated as the answer to the question, but in the context 
of a “socialist market economy”, ideology and social stability maintaining have to be 
taken into consideration. China’s government has been always avoiding the “Big Bang” 
and large-scale privatization as what happened in Eastern Europe. Instead, under the 
slogan of establishing a "modern enterprise system"2, the state gradually withdrew from 
the full involvement in SOEs, while maintaining a controlling stake in a large and medium 
size SOEs. The corporate reform in China (as set out in the 1994 Company Law) and 
public offering were the vehicles for “separating governmental and business functions” 
and “state asset preservation and increase.” In China, the state, or its agents, plays the role 
as “shareholder” functions performed by private owners in market economy. It is a kind of 
privatization in a broader sense. It is very meaningful to look into the consequences of this 
large-scale practice.  
 
Theoretically, few studies on privatization in the past have considered corporate 
governance and the relationship between corporate governance and privatization. Also 
almost no quantitative research has been done on this aspect. However, the principal 
dimensions of corporate governance reform are a part of the process of privatization, and 
privatization will further enhance corporate governance change of the companies. (e.g. 




embedded working mechanism for state share holding and investigate the effects of 
different degree of privatization, which is a breakthrough on the empirical research of 
privatization as well as corporate governance. 
 
1.2 Context of the study 
The SOE reform in China can be divided into three stages. On the first stage since 1978 up 
to the early 1980s, the profit retention system and bonus payments were introduced. 
During the second stage, beginning from the mid-1980s, the contract management system 
(CMS), the manager responsibility system (MRS) and the internal contract system (ISC) 
were launched, but the two-tier collusion3 held back the successful implementation of the 
reform measures. The major shortcoming of these two stages is the reform measures only 
dealt with incentives and distribution relationship. Only since the early 90s, privatization 
has been involved when various experiments did not work out. Chinese reformers 
auctioned off and leased some small-sized SOEs to individuals. Meanwhile, a program 
was announced to "grab and reinvigorate" 1000 large SOEs to form the "core" of the 
country's "modern enterprise system". The authority attempted to change the property-
rights relations in large and medium-size SOEs in the direction of privatization by 
introducing shareholding system, along with the development of the stock market. These 
corporative and listed firms accounted for about two-thirds of the assets held by all 
industrial SOEs and more than 70 percent of sales revenue, profits and tax receipts of all 
the SOEs, the reform would be a success if they can survive and be profitable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              




There are two stock exchanges in China. The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) was 
inaugurated in December, 1990, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) opened in 
April, 1991. The number of listed companies, trading volume, and total market 
capitalization have increased drastically, the total number of firms listed increased from 
183 in 1993 to over 500 in 1996 and over 1000 in 1999. (Appendix 1) 
 
In China’s stock markets, A-shares and B-shares the two major categories.  A-shares are 
for domestic investors only and quoted in Chinese Yuan, there are four sub-categories of 
A-shares: State shares are those held by the state. Legal person shares are shares owned 
by non-individual legal entities or institutions. Both state shares and legal person shares 
are not tradable at the two exchanges, but can be transferred to domestic institutions upon 
approval from the CSRC (China's Securities Regulatory Committee). Tradable A-shares 
are held and traded mostly by individuals. These shares are the only types of equity that is 
traded among domestic investors at the two exchanges. The employee shares are offered 
to workers and managers of a listed company, usually at a substantially discounted price. 
After a holding period of 6 to 12 months, the company may file with CSRC for allowing 
its employees to sell the shares in the open market.  
 
Besides A-shares, B-shares are available exclusively to foreign investors and some 
authorized domestic securities firms. The B-share market is separated from the A-share 
market, with SHSE B-shares denominated in US dollar and SZSE B-shares in Hong Kong 
dollar. H-shares are the same as B-shares except that they are issued and traded at the 
                                                                                                                                                                              





Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Finally, N-shares are listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange, either through IPOs or as ADRs.  In 1997, of the 745 companies listed on the 
two Exchanges, 76 companies issue both A-share and B-share, 25 companies issue B-
share only and 17 companies issue both A-share and H-share, but 627, the majority of 
companies only issue A-share. (Appendix 2) 
 
The word "State shareholding" was first seen in the Methods of Corporatization Test,4 
defined as "state shares are state assets as shares invested to companies by the department 
and institutions that are eligible to represent the state”. Along with the market 
development, now “State shares” is briefly defined as "Shares owned or held by the state 
in a company". 
 
What is called "State Owned Enterprises" cannot represent the situation nowadays, when 
100% state owned enterprises are replaced by the enterprises that have blended capital 
sources from various components of the economy. (Zhang, 1993) SOE will be too general 
of a term to describe the varieties since the proportion of state shares will be different 
among companies. The categories of other different kinds of shares and state’s direct and 
indirect control within different contexts are hard to define. Actually, after corporatization 
and the introduction of state shareholding, there is almost no “pure” SOE according to the 
original definition, the concept of state assets or state capital ought to be more and more 
widely accepted and used. A good percentage of listed companies that have “state capital” 
are corporatized from original SOEs. To date listed companies are not 100 percent owned 




1.3 Objective of the study  
This study explores how different levels of ownership divestiture affects the effectiveness 
and efficiency of privatization exercise with respect to corporate governance. It tests the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance as well.  
 
Theoretically, the study testifies the need of privatization; describes the relationship 
between privatization and corporate governance; describes the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance and answers how privatization suits China’s case.  
 
Empirically, the study tests whether the proportion of state shareholding, as defined as the 
degree of privatization will cause the difference of corporate governance among 
enterprises and whether the difference of corporate governance is linked to the difference 
of firms’ performance. To carefully examine the two relationships gives a light on future 
policy choice for the SOE reform. For example, to judge whether state should continue to 
stay as shareholders in the companies, further, to what degree, in what field; to decide the 
direction of further corporate governance reform according to their effects on firms’ 
performance.    
 
1.4 Contribution of the study 
First, there is abundant literature studying privatization, touching on every aspects of it. 
Corporate Governance is an area so much attention has also been paid. However, to look 
into privatization from the angle of Corporate Governance and empirically test the 
consequence of privatization is still a green field. 
                                                                                                                                                                              




Second, the study is in the context of China; that determines some specific characteristics 
of the study, especially the methodology. Literature search shows there is no empirical 
study on China’s privatization. The depth of discussion is somewhat restricted because the 
sensitivity of the topic in China; the availability of data is limited as China does not have 
any overt large-scale privatization. Since most of the previous studies concerning 
privatization constrict themselves in qualitative study, this one sheds a light on the 
quantitative aspect.  
 
Third, most of the previous studies did comparisons between before and after privatization, 
but few evidence has been gathered from the comparison between full and partial 
divestiture. Thus, the research model, the data mining process, the methodology, and the 
data analysis in this study have their special values. 
 
 
1.5 Organization of the study 
This is a six-chapter thesis. A review of the relevant literature is presented in the next 
chapter. It highlights the previous researches that form the foundation of the framework 
underlying this study. The relevant studies concerning China are summarized too. Chapter 
3 presents the empirical findings and puts forward the proposed research model and 
hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the variables, data and methodology and reports empirical 
results. Chapter 5 analyses and interprets the research results. Chapter 6 contains 





Chapter Two: Literature review  
 
Literature review has two parts. The first part probes the underlying reasons for the poor 
performance of SOEs and compares privatization versus other healing approaches. The 
second part describes the main aspects of corporate governance and how they relate to 
privatization.  
 
Part One: State-Owned Enterprises and Privatization 
 
 
2.1 SOEs and their Poor Performance  
State-owned enterprises are business enterprises owned by governments. Aharoni (1986, 
p.6) argues that SOEs have three distinguishing characteristics. First, they must be owned 
by the government; second, they must be engaged in the production of goods and services 
for sale and third, sales revenues of SOEs should bear some relationship to cost. There is 
no doubt that Government ownership has far-reaching implications on SOEs.  
 
Arguments of Zeckhauser & Horn (1989, p.14) are complementary to the definition: there 
are three common features of SOEs. First, they are frequently created to meet objectives 
of redistribution; second, various groups can pressure the enterprises to meet possibly 
conflicting objectives and the “confusion of goals” has an important impact on enterprise 




rights and resources5. They name SOE as “available pot”, which means it can be used for 
redistribution without any visible losses suffering. As Aharoni (1986, p.6) argues, a 
government can achieve its specific objectives to benefit certain interest groups while not 
making public know how the resources are used. 
 
The concept of “efficiency” is central to the evaluation of SOEs’ performance. The 
orthodox definition is “Pareto efficiency”, the common criteria for successful performance 
is profitability and productive efficiency (Duncan & Bollard, 1992, p.20; Jackson & Price, 
1994, p.7). If the analysis is on the enterprise level as in this study, the allocated efficiency 
is not explored. For instance, a state enterprise is exploiting a monopoly position, though 
economic welfare decreases, it is still an evidence of commercial success.  
 
The low efficiency of SOEs is a very prevalent phenomenon all over the world. As 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) concur that except a few exceptions, state ownership is 
broadly inconsistent with the efficiency argument. In fact, SOEs’ ambiguous goals, 
privileges and easy access by the government make the low efficiency very likely to 
happen. 
 
In 1993, except for few joint ventures and joint-stock companies, firms in China had one 
of the three types of ownership: state-owned enterprises (SOEs); collective enterprises 
(CEs) (including urban collectives and rural collectives; the latter are also known as 
Township-Village Enterprises, or TVEs); and private enterprises (including foreign firms). 
                                                          
5 Rights include legal monopoly, relief from regulation or implicit price guarantees. Resources include the use of rivers, 




CEs and TVEs together are referred to as "non-state-owned firms" while SOEs and CEs 
together are referred to as "public firms." At that time, SOEs are all owned by the central 
government in name, but they are either supervised by the central or by local governments 
based on their affiliations.6 Officially, the size of China’s SOEs is divided into three 
categories by China Statistical Bureau according to their assets: large, medium, and small. 
(The precise definition varies by industry) Increasingly, economists and policy makers 
designate about 1,000 of the largest SOEs as “large” and refer to the rest as “small”. 7 
(Cao et al., 1997) 
 
By the early 1990s it had become evident that the detained SOE reform had seriously 
undermined China's development. From 1978 to 1993, the fraction of SOEs’ industrial 
output of the whole economy declined from 78% to 47%; the share of SOE employment 
of the overall employment was down from 75% to less than 60% in the urban areas and 
from 60% to about 30% in the rural areas. In 1996, the state sector was in a net deficit, 1/3 
of the state-owned properties on book were worthless properties. (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 1997) (See Table 1) On the macro-economic scale, duplicated investments, 
repeated constructions and the consequent unscientific industry structure happened in 
every industry and every region. Loss caused by duplicated construction took part of about 
1/4 to 1/3 of the total investments. Yet SOEs continued to absorb more than 3/4 of 
domestic loans. Because of its privileges, it crowded out non-state firms’ investments, 
which have been the engines of China's growth. It also undermined an already weak state-
                                                          
6Provincial, city, and county governments are referred to as local governments. 
7 As to 1997, of the 118,000 industrial SOEs, 87,905 are classified by Chinese authorities as "independent accounting 
entities". These are the industrial SOEs on which China’s statistical authorities systematically gather data, and they 
account for about 70 percent of China's industrial fixed assets. It is within this subset of industrial SOEs that China’s 




dominated banking system, the banks' non-performing assets were equivalent to 20 
percent of the portfolios, the net worth of these banks was already negative.  
 
Table 1: SOEs’ output from year 1991-19958
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
% of fixed asset investment growth in SOEs 23.9 44.4 61.8 30.4 17.5 
SOEs’ Industrial output growth (%) 8.62 12.4 5.7 6.5 8.2 
individual Economy growth (%) 25.29 5.7 66.2 56.3 51.5 
Other economy growth (%) 50.11 6.5 92.5 74.3 37.2 
Net profit of profitable SOEs and State 
shareholding companies 
35.17 165.89 364.62 346.42 26.03 
 
On the other hand, in 1996, SOEs’ tax burden was 2.3 times that of the collective 
economy, 8.3 times that of the foreign ventures and 13 times of that of the firms controlled 
by HongKong, Taiwan and Macau capital. SOEs had to take other social liabilities too. In 
1996, roughly, of 7400 million employees in SOEs, 2500-3000 employees were redundant. 
 
In China, 72.8% of the medium and large-scale enterprises were SOEs, of which, the top 
1,000 SOEs accounted for 40% of total assets, 51% of net assets, and 66% of profits in the 
state sector. (People’s Daily, August 14, 1995) Moreover, 90% of loss-making SOEs were 
small SOEs; 60% of all small SOEs were not profitable (Zhou & Shen, 1997). Owing to 
their importance in the national economy, large and medium size enterprises have been 
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percent of SOE industrial output.  




given the highest priority in Chinese economic policies. The strength of the reform effort 
was “to vitalize large and medium-sized enterprises”. 
 
2.2 Underlying theoretical explanations 
A) State over-interference 
 
The first reason for SOEs’ low efficiency is that government interference brings public 
failure, by Stiglitz (1989, p.45) from the new institutional economics view. He argues that 
when government interferes, public failure steps in because government’s information is 
limited; government’s controls over private responses to its action limited; government’s 
control over bureaucracy is limited and political process itself has limitations. As a result, 
imperfect information and incomplete markets may apply to the government. Its power of 
redistribution may give rise not only to inequalities, but also to wasteful rent-seeking 
activity. Current government may impose blind commitment on future governments. 
Furthermore, the ineffective incentive structure leads to low efficiency and lacking of 
competition leads to monopoly. According to new institutional economics, to monitor the 
game and enforce the rules should be the primary function of Government.  
 
Stiglitz’s focused on the fields where government should stay, as government is not 
omnipotent in all the industries. In some industries government can be more efficient, 
such as public goods providing and “natural” monopoly (or oligopoly) sector, where too 
many firms’ trying to take advantage of the sector’s inherent economies of scale will 




such as price-setting or profit regulation is imperative to keep the cost of entry and exit by 
rival firms relatively low to pose sufficiently strong discipline on the incumbent firm (or 
firms) to keep prices at competitive levels. However, within the typical “naturally” 
competitive sectors, maximum social efficiency is realized when numerous firms are 
producing the product (or service). Government intervention impedes competition (Parker, 
1995; Kikeri et.al, 1994) and leads to efficiency loss because in addition to government’s 
crowding out effect, private investment and profit efficiency may be sacrificed to cater 
other objectives when considering externalities. And when the various objectives clashes, 
the state can take care of neither aspect (Ayub & Hegstad, 1986). The result is either SOEs 
relying on government for bailing out or government protecting high-cost SOEs from 
competition to save budget problem (Kikeri et.al, 1994). The government should withdraw 
from these specific industries, leaving the space to private sector. (World Bank, 1996)  
 
Government interference is one of the main reasons for the low-efficiency of SOEs, but 
does the government’s ownership in the SOEs matter? As Jackson & Price (1995, p.8) 
point out “Efficiency focuses attention on the questions of ownership”, economists have 
long been concerned with the relationship between ownership and efficiency. Though 
Neoclassical economic theory suggests that efficiency is mainly a function of market and 
incentive structures rather than ownership (Nellis, 1994), it is a big doubt whether 
impartiality can be assured if the government is the owner and at the same time is the 
regulator enacting the rules. In theory, the state can still own enterprises and ensure that 
the above conditions hold, while in practice the full set of the above conditions is rarely 
met, and even when it is met, it is not normally sustained. (Boycko et.al, 1996) Often in 




commercial objectives at the top of the agenda, but as soon as the crisis fades, 
commitment to managerial autonomy and primacy of commercial goals can fade as well 
(Kikeri, Nellis & Shirley, 1994).  
 
Some cases of successful SOEs in the world seem to pose challenge on the inference that 
SOEs cannot evade the fate of low-efficiency. However, it is undeniable that the SOE 
problem is so common and so liable to happen. As Nellis & Shirley (1994) point out: 
though the comparison of the performance of public with private enterprises has not 
consistently provided compelling evidence that the ownership matters, state ownership 
which is created to overcome or correct market failure can sometimes aggravate or 
perpetuate it, to the extent that the high costs occur in the intervention.   
 
In China, evidence from the survey conducted by China Entrepreneur Survey System on 
industrial sector in 1994 9  shows that on many aspects corporatized enterprises are 
unwillingly constrained by various governmental institutions. When asked how to 
promote the enterprises reform, 62.4% of the enterprises believe that changing 
government’s function is the most important thing, and more than 70% of the companies 
said there was no need to have upper-level departments. Of all the interferences of the 
government, some are improper, but when some appropriate interference need be 
implemented, they are treated as illegitimate too.  
 
Even listed companies in China cannot escape from government over-interference 




on the average, individual shareholders have no more than 0.3% of the seats on the board 
even though their group possess approximately one third of total outstanding shares. On 
the other hand, the state is over-represented10 on the board. 50% of positions are filled by 
government officials, substantially higher than its average 30% of stake in the listed 
companies. Unlike common large shareholders, state has very specific characteristics. For 
instance, the upper-level managers are inspected by the Party and appointed as the 
representatives of the state assets, which do not belong to them. Their incentives are not 
only discounted but also misdirected. There is also a contradiction between the economic 
targets and the political consideration of share controlling. State shares must preserve and 
expand their values continuously. However, they are regulated not to be transferable for 
fear of state’s losing control in listed companies if private investors are only interested in 
buying instead of selling the shares.  There was a decrease of state shareholding from 
35.1% in 1996 to 29.5% in 1998, but it was mainly by natural process. Since state shares 
are non-tradable, state shareholding entities neither have the capital nor the incentive to 
buy bonus shares. They often give up or transfer the buying in rights to other legal persons 
which result in the passive decrease of state share proportion after every stock 
subscription. (Ni, 1993) 
 
Actually, over-intervention is a relative term. In the old central planned economy, 
government had to intervene as it was its responsibility. “Over” or “under” are only 
relevant in a market economy. If the government does not change its style of 
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administration and management according to the requirements from the market in a 
transition economy, it “over” intervened. Government’s functions should be separated on 
two folds. One is the separation of the function of managing the economy and setting the 
rules; the other is the separation of the function of state asset supervisor and the function 
of state asset manager.  
 
Is this an unsolvable problem of SOEs? Liu & Gao (1999) concur that the requirement of 
the separation in essence is contradicting with the nature of state ownership in the 
companies. They argue since only if the government is the representative of the state 
assets, to separate the government from enterprises means to deprive it of its property 
rights and residual claimants. This problem also exists in some well-managed state 
controlling companies in developed countries. Therefore, the problem is not whether the 
government manages more or less, directly or indirectly; it is whether state shares should 
stay in certain industries. By controlling pivotal industries and "life line" industries, state 
capital can still take a leading role in the economy. To separate the functions of the 
government from enterprises touches the core of the dilemma of state ownership. 
 
B) Principal-agent problem 
Besides the problem of government over-interference and public failure, state ownership 
has another universal problem, principal-agent problem. The principal-agent problem has 
long stepped in as the major explanation underpinning the problems of SOEs and it is the 
most powerful weapon of privatization advocates. “Since decision makers in government 
do not own the resources they control, they cannot appropriate the full benefits resulting 




An agent is one who is contracted to perform some activity on behalf of a principal and 
receives a benefit for his or her services. The principal benefits from the agent’s efforts to 
the extent that the agent works efficiently and effectively to accomplish the principal’s 
goals. The central premise of principal-agent theory is that goal conflict exists when 
parties with different goals engage in co-operative behavior (Jensen & Meckling, 1986). It 
requires the principal to devise methods to ensure that the agent does not pursue his or her 
own interest at the principal’s expense.  
 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) believe the agency problem is intrinsic to the modern publicly 
owned corporations. However, it is typically more serious in SOEs than in private firms 
because both the authority and incentive for the bureaucrats to curtail opportunistic over-
consumption are generally lacking (Brumby & Hyndman, 1998, p.33). There is no 
institution that is well informed and stimulated to supervise enterprises on behalf of the 
state; managers have so big rights that are unproportional to the stocks and stock options 
they have. Cowan (1990, p.8) points out that governments tend to go two extremes in 
controlling their SOEs. The monitoring is either so close that managers lost almost all 
autonomy in day-to-day decision making, or it is so loose that the government has no 
detailed knowledge of enterprises’ financial status. As a result, the agents are relatively 
unconstrained on position related consuming and asset-stripping. (Shielfer & Vishny, 
1997). Zeckhauser & Horn (1989, p.35) believe the diffuses and non-transferability of 
ownership, the absence of A-share price, and indeed the generic difficulty residual 
claimants would have in expressing “voice”, all tend to magnify the agency losses 




resulted from weak external pressures in capital markets and product markets are the 
“additional agency problems” in transition economy.  
 
2.3 The way out 
The strategic operational weaknesses in the SOE model coupled with political interference 
and serious principal-agent problem produces one unsurprising result—inefficiency 
(Havrylyshyn &Mcgettingan, 1999). The ultimate objective of solving the problem brings 
on the global wave of privatization. Nellis (1998) calculates that, from 1980 to 1991, 
roughly 6800 medium and large-scale enterprises were privatized in non-transition 
economies and close to 60,000 such companies were privatized in the transition 
economies since independence. During 1995-2000 privatization was expected to take 
place in more than 100 countries, raising over US$200bn funds. (Economist, 1998a)  
 
However, we should not forget our main goal. As Peter Forsyth reminded:” The first 
question should not be whether, or how many, public enterprises should be privatized. 
Rather, it should be how the economic performance of these firms can be improved. This 
might be achieved by some combination of full or partial privatization and changes in the 
incentive patterns and operating rules for public enterprises.” (CIS Policy Forum, Sept. 
1985). Setting out from the goal of improving the economic performance of SOEs, we 
need to ask questions about what, why and how. 
 




The concept of privatization is not new, it appeared in the writing of Adam Smith as early 
as 1762. Notwithstanding, in the global privatization tide, the first appearance of 
privatization in a dictionary came in 1983. (Cowan, 1990, p.6) There are so many 
definitions of privatization, differing from every book or paper. They simulate with each 
other while embracing few characteristics according to the different context and goals. As 
Jackson & Price (1995, p.4) conclude “No single definition is right or wrong, each must 
be judged in terms of its usefulness for a specific purpose.” 
 
To sum up, the categories of disputes range from very narrow and strict terms to broader 
and more inclusive terms. “Privatization can be defined in narrow terms reserving the 
concept for the sale of public sector assets, alternatively, it can be widened to incorporate 
a number of associated policies” Jackson & Price (1995, p.4). 
 
In a strict sense, privatization has to be the transfer of majority of ownership to the private 
sector. The turning point should be 50%, though still it is not well defined and clearly 
listed out. Partial divestiture, especially when the state still holds majority shares, is not 
categorized as privatization. For example, according to Nellis (1998), privatization is “a 
transfer of ownership such that a majority of the shares or equity in an enterprise passes 
from the state or public ownership into private hands”. Words such as “Sale of at least 50 
percent of the shares”, “transfer of majority ownership” and “the predominant share in 
ownership of assets on transfer” are used in the definition of Beesley & Littlechild (1994), 





Broader definitions include the transfer of ownership and/or control of state-owned 
organizations to private investors, either full or partial in terms of the amount of equity 
sold to private investors only if the ownership has been transferred from public to private 
hands.  
 
According to Cowan (1990), the proportion divested may leave the government with 
either majority or minority shares, but the practical effect is to put the current operation of 
the firm or service in the hands of private managers. Some relative standards of 
privatization involve both divestiture and non-divestiture measures, they may or may not 
involve transfer of ownership. The main types of non-divestiture privatization options 
include organizational, financial and operational restructuring, together with 
commercialization and corporatization, the privatization of management and contracting 
out.  
 
According to UNCTAD (1995, p.64), privatization includes both divestiture and non-
divestiture options. It refers to any procedure aimed at the transferring of ownership, 
operating and/or development rights from the public to the private sector. It may also be 
the application of private sector objectives and disciplines in the operation and 
management of SOEs, combined with the transfer of commercial and financial risks to 
their management in most cases. To a further degree, some researchers treat privatization 
as a process comprising all the inter-enterprise changes related and count the external 
environment under which privatization takes place into the boundary. (Cowan, 1990, p.6; 




One must emphasize that all the definitions are contingent; they vary with the different 
contexts and objectives of the users, as determined by the various economic systems. To 
take the definition that only more than 50% shares’ transfer is privatization as an example, 
in some cases, a small “golden share” of government allows control, also, in a typical 
market environment, it takes much less than 50 percent ownership to have a controlling 
influence. Therefore, the common definition of a majority private ownership may be 
questioned.  
 
In China’s case, because both privatization and restructuring of SOEs are new phenomena 
and unfamiliar concepts in a centrally planned economy in transition, to clarify the use of 
the terms "privatization" and "private ownership" in China’s context is a necessity. Most 
of the time, people do not use the term "privatization" (siyouhua), relying instead on 
several other terms: (i) zhuanzhi, or "change of ownership;" (ii) suoyouzhi gaizao, or 
"ownership transformation;" and (iii) gufenzhi gaizao, or "transformation of ownership to 
a joint stock/shareholding system." (Similarly, the Chinese often use "non-public 
ownership" (feigongyou) as a substitute for "private ownership" (siyou).) Each of these 
terms means a change of ownership from state ownership to various forms of non-state 
ownership. This can entail ownership by an individual, by many individuals, or by groups 
of individuals together with some institutions; it can also entail other hybrid or mixed 
ownership forms. Because the essential feature of this ownership reform is to move away 
from 100% state ownership, the use of "privatization" in China on a broader sense is 
consistent with that in the literature of partial divestiture and the "private ownership" is 




In 1994, China began a quiet reform in privatizing and restructuring its SOEs under the 
slogan "Grab the big and loose the small" (zhuadafangxiao). This reform proceeded in 
three areas: (i) privatization of small SOEs at the county level; (ii) mass layoffs of SOE 
workers at the city level; and (iii) mergers (jianbing), groupings/conglomerations 
(jituanhua), corporatizations (gongsihua), and public offerings (shangshi) of some large 
SOEs. SOE reform made significant progress in the first two areas: by the end of 1996, up 
to 70% of small SOEs had been privatized in pioneering provinces and about half were 
privatized in many other provinces. In addition, about ten million workers from SOEs and 
urban collectives were laid off by the end of 1996 and up to twenty million, or more than 
10% of urban labor force, was out of their SOE jobs by the end of 1997(Qian, 1998). The 
third area of reform deals with large and medium size firms, which is the focus of my 
study.  
 
B) Why Privatize 
Corresponding to the over-interference of the government and the serious principle-agent 
problem in SOEs, any measure that can overcome the problems and increase SOEs’ 
efficiency will be thought as a feasible solvent.  
 
Privatization is said to be able to enhance competition, simplify the principal-agent 
problem and most importantly, create the potential for efficiency gains (Havrylyshyn & 
McGettingan, 1999). As Kikeri et.al. (1994) points out, enhancing efficiency is the 
primary goal of privatization. Correspondingly, researchers often judge the performance 
of privatized enterprises in terms of profits and the return on capital instead of other 




effective to achieve the goals of the reform as well as superior to other propositions. In 
fact, there are some disputes existing. 
 
One dispute focuses on whether the change of external factors (i.e. market environment) 
can substitute the change of ownership. The other focuses on whether the change of 
internal factors (i.e. restructuring) can substitute the change of ownership. As for the 
former one, though there is no unanimous conclusion, most researchers believe the change 
of market environment cannot substitute privatization, but on the contrary, privatization 
will enhance competition. (E.g. Kikeri et al., 1994) The latter dispute is at the enterprise 
level and corresponds to the efficiency confinement. It include the discussion of 
commercialization, restructuring, corporatization and privatization. 
 
I) Commercialization, Restructuring and Privatization 
Commercialization is closely related to the change of market environment and 
restructuring. It is the introduction of commercial principles and objectives into the 
management and operations of an SOE. Part of this procedure may involve removing 
government subsidies; applying user charges; commercial objectives and commercial 
accounting standards and turning SOEs into a commercially viable and profit-making 
enterprise exposed to market disciplines. The internal measures in commercialization are 
included in the process of restructuring. Restructuring involves making changes in the 
SOE allowing it to operate more efficiently, such as labor-shedding, product mix changes, 
the diversion of sales to advance economies, and instituting marketing improvements. 
(Havrylyshyn & McGettingan, 1999) Restructuring includes organizational and labor 




In the dispute on restructuring and privatization, one school of thoughts argues that 
restructuring, rather than privatization, should be put at the center of the analysis of 
enterprise sector reform. The other school trusts that restructuring cannot substitute 
privatization. (Frydman et al., 1993)   
 
The former argument stems from the acknowledgment that the SOEs’ problem is not 
necessarily related to their ownership, it can be overcome by the change of objectives, 
organizational cultures and control systems (Wortzel & Wortzel, 1989). As to the latter 
argument, there is a significant body of empirical work which convincingly shows that 
privatization involving ownership transfer substantially improves various indicators of 
performance both in financial and service quality aspects (e.g. Galal et al., 1994; 
Megginson et al., 1994; Vining and Boardman, 1992). Even after taking account of 
possible selection bias (“cherry picking”), it is found that privatization is associated with 
better enterprise performance (Earle & Estrin, 1996; Barberis et al., 1996; Smith et al., 
1997). They suggest it may take several years after privatization to see its effects. Early 
studies may suffer strongly from it. Though short of ownership transfer indeed made some 
SOEs better off, two related problems persist (Kikeri et al., 1994). First, the reforms are 
technically and politically difficult to implement because the necessary steps in the full 
reform package have seldom been enacted. And second is sustainability. The 
improvements are exceedingly difficult to sustain without changing ownership. Because 
when the external pressure weakens, government ownership facilitates poor performance. 
EBRD (1997) compares the early “defensive” restructuring11 by both SOEs and privatized 
                                                          




enterprises, evidence shows that privatized firms have done better than SOEs in 
maintaining an improved performance.  
 
China launched a comprehensive restructuring program in the 1980s to revive its SOEs. 
Measures include separating profits and taxes, allowing the firm to pay less tax and retain 
some profits, breaking three irons (iron rice bowl, iron wage, and iron chair)12  and 
adopting the contract responsibility system etc., they did improve performance in at least 
some industrial SOEs. Nonetheless, close to 30 percent of all SOEs still in red in 1992 
(Yusuf & Hua, 1992), the share of industrial SOEs dropped from close to 70 percent in 
1986 to 53 percent in 1990 nationally. It proved that the first school of thoughts did not 
work in China’s case.  
 
ii) Corporatization and privatization 
Corporatization goes further than commercialization and restructuring in the sense that 
corporatization means the creation of a normal limited liability company incorporated 
under the corporation law, and the transfer of the business conducted by the government 
to that company. (Duncan & Bollard, 1992, p.21) This means that the SOE or 
departmental organization is converted into a legally and economically independent legal 
person, while the government retains its ownership (Sly & Weigall, 1992, p.14). 
Corporatization has been applied mostly to medium or large-scale enterprises. (UNCTAD, 
1995, p.70) 
 
                                                          




Duncan & Bollard (1992) believe that commercialization involves the conversion of an 
SOE into a separate entity under statutory law, while corporatization involves the 
conversion of an SOE into a joint stock company (for large enterprises) or a limited 
liability company under company legislation. The underlying theoretical rationale for 
corporatization is relatively clear-cut: it is felt that efficiency can be improved by 
approximating a private sector model; the objective is to be as difficult to distinguish the 
corporatized enterprises from private firms as possible.  In the strict sense, to the extent 
that the commercial and investment risks are not fully transferred to the private sector, 
such reforms are not privatization. It is an imperative transition stage to privatization as 
happened in Australia, Finland, France, Malaysia, the Netherlands and New Zealand. 
Following corporatization, privatization is treated as going from non-divestiture to 
divestiture options. 
 
Along with corporatization, corporate governance comes into play. Corporate governance 
is often defined as the interaction between owners and managers in controlling and 
directing a company (OECD, 1998, p.1). Corporate governance is especially suitable for 
the cases with the objective of widening share ownership and the need to ensure effective 
corporate governance (UNCTAD, 1995, p.71). Corporate governance relates to  
privatization on several aspects. First, SOEs problems largely stem from the weakly 
constrained principal-agent problem, but principal-agent theory is one of the standpoints 
of corporate governance, whose main objective is to efficiently control the principal-agent 
problem. Second, corporate governance focuses on modern corporations, the convention is 
to corporatize SOEs before privatization (usually partial in China). As Pannier & Schiavo-




are the process of corporatization.” Thus, these corporatized SOEs need to improve 
corporate governance in the process of privatization. Third, how privatization is more 
intimately related to corporate governance has been partly disclosed by Estrin (1998, p.11): 
“The lengthy experiments with alternative governance mechanisms for state owned firms 
led to a view that the persistent deficiencies of state ownership could best be addressed by 
privatization”. Also, Morin (1998, p.63) argues: “Along with such transfers (privatization) 
can come a change in management and even a radical restructuring of a firm’s deliberative 
or executive authority. In this latter case, the change in ownership goes hand in hand with 
a shift in the manner of corporate governance”. The process of privatization is a pressure 
as well as a chance for SOEs to further improve their corporate governance more than 
scratch the surface. Based on the assumption that different governance structure leads to 
different performance, ceteris paribus, the interest here is to further identify the effects 
privatization poses on corporate governance and how it works.  
 
The core of the contention may still be whether to transfer the ownership, that is to say, if 
the provisional system of corporate governance can be achieved, why will ‘full 
privatization’ still be needed? The argument of Zeckhauser & Horn (1989, p.36) is to the 
point: if the corporate form is imitated, only private ownership is substituted by public 
ownership does not mean the benefits of private ownership can be replicated because first, 
some features of private ownership are not replicable with public ownership. There is no 
share price, no ability to increase or decrease one’s holdings, no large shareholders, and 
no stock options. Second, public ownership brings with it attention to certain classes of 
government goals and practices. E.g. salaries for top executives will be very low by 




The pre-premier of New Zealand Roger Douglas claimed in his 1988 Budget: “Retaining 
ownership of all these businesses (SOEs) would entail the ongoing risk that a large portion 
of New Zealand’s assets would under perform”. Privatization changes the ownership, and 
thus changes the structure of incentives and the criteria used to judge success. 
 
C) How China Privatizes SOEs 
In China, the corporate governance of the SOEs is deeply affected by the corporatization 
process and the formation of the shares, which depends to a great extent upon the 
founders' administrative affiliation and their ownership before going public. China's listed 
companies are either created by transforming SOEs, or launched by a group of legal 
persons, and occasionally by individuals.  
 
Under the “total quota” of how many shares in total should be issued each year 
determined by the State Planning Commission (SPC) and CSRC, to corporatize an SOE, 
the first step is to separate non-productive assets such as schools and hospitals from 
productive ones. Productive assets often account for 50 to 75% of total assets of the to-be-
listed stock company, while non-productive assets are left with the SOE. An accounting 
firm is then hired to audit the separated productive assets and the SOE’s financial 
statements for the last three years. In the meantime, managers of the SOE contact other 
enterprises and institutions to see if they are willing to be the legal person co-founders of 
the stock company. They also talk intensively with the local government and Party 
officials for candidates of managers, the board and supervision committee members. 
Officers representing the state in the companies are handpicked by the government from a 




such firms end up with the arrangement that the original managers and Party officials of 
the SOEs keep the key positions on the board and in supervision committee in the new 
stock company (Xu & Wang, 1997). Then the SOE finds a group of securities firms as 
underwriters. After the IPO, the original SOE either disappears or becomes the majority 
shareholder of the stock company. In the former case, the local office of the Bureau of 
State Property Management (a central government agency, BSPM hereafter) acts as the 
state shareholder of the listed company if the SOE was owned by the central government 
or its agencies before the IPO. Otherwise, the local finance bureau, or a local government 
holding company plays the role of state share representative.  
 
Legal person dominated stock companies are formed in a different way that is more 
democratic with less government interference, even though these legal person institutions 
themselves may be controlled by the state. So long as they are not 100% owned by the 
state, equities these legal persons hold in the new stock company are classified as legal 
person shares. In theory, they can nominate board members and choose corporate officers 
at their will.  
 
Part two: Corporate governance and Privatization 
 
Corporate governance functions in three aspects, i.e., how to allocate and use control 
rights; how to supervise and evaluate the board of directors, the managers and the 
employees and how to design and carry out incentive system to realize those two goals. 
Optimal corporate governance gives managers sufficient freedom to manage the 




managers to protect the interest of the shareholders. Based on the conclusion of Duncan & 
Bollard (1992, p.23), the main corporate governance differences between corporatized and 
non-corporatized firms are on ownership, control and incentives. 
                                                     
2.4 Ownership  
Ownership concentration and ownership structure are two main dimensions of ownership.  
Ownership concentration is analyzed as an alternative control mechanism in corporate 
governance. The pros include first, ownership concentration can help ease information 
asymmetries (Williamson, 1975) because it is relatively easy for individual shareholders 
to coordinate actions and demand information from management teams with which to 
assess their performance (Berle & Means, 1932). Second, owning a large percentage of 
stock not only enhances shareholders’ control but also increases their incentives to 
monitor managers, as the effectiveness of large shareholders is intimately tied to their 
ability to defend their rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Third, as transition economies 
usually have a more volatile economic environment and immature market, ownership 
concentration is more suitable for transition economies (Xu & Wang, 1997). However, it 
seems that the state is an exception in the application of the theory. State ownership is a 
renowned example of concentrated control with no effective legal protection, no cash flow 
rights and socially harmful objectives (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Xu & Wang (1997) find 
in China, firms' profitability is either negatively related or not related to the fraction of 
state shares. On the contrary, Chen (1998) finds just the opposite evidence, SOEs with 
larger state share fractions performed better than those controlled by the private sector. He 




proportion of state shareholding (the degree of privatization) and the companies' 
performance is still not clear in previous studies. 
 
2.5 Firm Control 
A) Board Composition 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), boards are the front-line control mechanism for 
reducing agency problems in modern corporations. Boards are responsible for corporate 
leadership; they use their power to hire, fire, and compensate the top-level decision 
managers, and monitor important decisions, while leaving day-to-day operations to the 
chief executive officer (CEO) and senior executives. Board composition is believed to be 
a most important dimension of control structure.  
 
In the various mixtures of directors, the outside vs. inside directors (e.g., top managers of 
the firm) mixture is the most often discussed issue. The most popular argument is the 
necessity of decreasing the relative number of inside directors. It is believed insiders are 
representing their own interests but not the owners' interest, and since insiders expand 
their power in a "power vacuum" in transition economy, the problem incurred can be said 
as a principal-agent problem. Outside directors are believed to be not liable to collude 
with managers to expropriate wealth from residual claimants, and they have more 
incentives to carry out their tasks in the interests of the shareholders to maintain their 
prestige as independent expertise. Also outside directors can provide a breadth of 






 However, there are counter arguments of the inside directors’ advantages of too. Kesner 
& Johnson (1990) summarize the benefits into four points. First, insiders have valuable 
specific information and experience and they are more influential on the management. 
Second, inside directors provide a direct communication link between the board and the 
other organizational members (Bacon and Brown, 1975). Third, insiders sit on the board 
as part of the “passing the baton” process, preparing for future leadership position 
transfers (Vancil, 1987). Fourth, insiders are often promoted to the board to provide 
incentives for their excellent managerial performance. The empirical evidences are mixed. 
Negative evidences are found by Weisbach (1988) and Hermalin & Weisbach (1989). 
While in some cases, firms with insider-dominated board show higher performance 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Schellenger, Wood & Tashakori, 1989; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). Due to these mixed results, some recent studies predict that the balance between 
insiders and outsiders depend on different firm’s characteristics and various environmental 
factors.  
 
    Compared to Russia and Eastern European countries, where insiders got much control 
rights in the companies, the insider control of China's SOEs is "de-facto control" other 
than "legal control". Insiders do not have companies' property rights in a legal sense, 
which is called "unsecured property rights" (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). It stems from 
the transferring of control rights and revenue to the managers in SOE reform while formal 
privatization is lacking in China. (Qian, 1995; Wu, 1995) Zhang (1995) points out the 





    Since "de-facto control" is unsecured by laws, the tendency of changing unsecured 
property rights to secured rights will be prevalent. One method is to admit that insiders are 
the owners of the assets, but privatization in China is not feasible. Large enterprises can 
hardly find capable buyers too. The other method is asset stripping, when insiders' 
embezzlement is constrained by the laws or ethic principals, they will decompose and 
appropriate the assets (Zhang, 1995). The basic idea to deal with insider control is to bring 
in proper institutional arrangements and the supervision from the owner, but to bring in 
governmental interference to constrain insider control is not a good idea, that will 
ultimately offset the positive effects of insiders. (Zhang, 1995)  
 
Besides the insider problem on the Board, the structure of the Supervision Committee also 
has the same problem, which will largely hinder its functions. 
 
B) Organizational system 
In China, the reason that the government and the Party are willing to award some control 
rights to the managers and do not worry about losing control, may because they still 
control the personnel appointments and the incentives. Wang (1998) concurs; to rectify 
the deviation of managers’ behavior, the organizational mechanism should be changed. 
According to her, organizational mechanism is a kind of playing rule concerning the 
formation of the managers, the awarding of control rights, the evaluation and supervision 
to stimulate and constrain managerial behavior. 
 
In China compensation mechanism has certain changes, but the organizational system has 




departments according to the survey figures in 1994. The result is that managers have the 
characteristic of the "Dual figures": SOE managers are first risk-averse, known as "no 
exploit, but no fault", only if "no fault", their positions are secured, and all the welfare and 
consumption on the position are secured. And if the risk of losing the position is locked, 
managers will be risk-favorite, after all, they are not gambling on their own money.  
 
Though the personnel mechanism needs change, to completely supersede it is not wise. 
Because of the mechanism, the power balance between the government and enterprises in 
some degree curbed the fast draining of state assets, as happened in Russia and Eastern 
Europe (Qian, 1995). 
 
2.6 Incentive 
A) Compensation Mechanisms  
Wang (1998) defines: compensation mechanism is a kind of revenue arrangement using 
salary, allowance and bonus to stimulate and constrain managerial behavior; the essence is 
the degree to which the managers are involved in residual claims. 
 
From the beginning of the 90s, many cities and regions in China began to enforce reported 
annual salary system (Nianxinzhi), until 1996, 50% enterprises had this system, the 
proportion even reached 80% in a few cities (Reform Daily, 1996). However, the deviation 
of SOE managers' behavior was not solved and the SOE loss was expanding. One of the 
problems emerged from the annual salary system is: since the chairman and the CEO are 




enjoys it. But if the chairman is included, the Board should not decide the norm, for now 
the interest balance has been broken, the norm has to be decided by government 
departments. Weak supervision as well as government interference is the inevitable result.  
 
Besides Nianxinzhi, there are also some other choices for compensation system reform, 
such as managerial shareholding, stock option, etc. Those have not been tested in the 
previous studies.  
 
B) Managerial ownership 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) divide stockholders into two groups - inside shareholders who 
manage the firm and have exclusive voting rights and outside shareholders who have no 
voting rights. In a transition context, Frydman et al. (1997) argue that making a distinction 
between managerial insider ownership and employee insider ownership is important. 
Their results suggest contrast to employee insider ownership; managerial ownership 
brings a strong improvement in firms’ performance. For a long time the researchers are 
searching for the arrangements, that whenever the managers seek their own interests, they 
expand the wealth of the shareholders in the meantime and the agency cost is reduced 
(Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managerial ownership becomes the 
one important focus in the study of corporate governance because it is an equilibrium 
ownership distribution between insiders and outsiders. 
 
There are two well known opposite hypotheses in this area. One is the convergence-of-
interest hypothesis, stating the costs of deviation from value-maximization decline as 




the more likely they will make decisions consistent with maximizing shareholders’ wealth 
(Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, the entrenchment 
hypothesis concurs that with effective control; a manager who controls a substantial 
fraction of the firm’s equity may have more general influences and indulge his preference 
for non-value-maximizing behavior. Corporate assets can be less valuable when managed 
by an individual free from checks on his control (Demsetz, 1983; Beatty & Zajac, 1994). 
The results of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell & Servaes (1990) are consistent with 
the hypothesis that corporate value is a function of the structure of equity ownership. 
 
Generally, the strongest empirical evidences of ownership structure and the oft-cited 
literatures are not from transition economies, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out. 
However, some studies point to the danger of insider privatization leading to vested 
interests that thrive on rent-seeking corruption, monopoly profits and the consequent 
objection to complete reforms. These will work against the establishment of an open, 











Chapter Three: Empirical Findings and Hypotheses  
 
The literature review helps to sharpen the research questions and gives us a 
comprehensive theoretical basis, by referring to the actual situation of China. I developed 
hypotheses based on the figures resulted from the descriptive analysis to fit China’s 
specific context within the framework of literature review.  In order to put the descriptive 
analysis clearly, I introduce the variables at the same time. Results of hypotheses will be 
analyzed in the next chapter. I have 21 hypotheses, touching most of the aspects of 
corporate governance. 
 
Ownership structure is the primary element in determining governance arrangements in 
the process of privatization. Since China takes the form of state shareholding, I group 
companies based on their state shareholding for comparison.  
 
According to the China’s authorities, when state shares account for more than 50% of a 
firm’s total shares, state has an absolute control. When the proportion of state shares 
ranges from 30% to 50%, state has a relative control. When state shares’ proportion is less 
than 30%, state only has a weak control. These are represented by the variable Degree of 
Privatization (DPR). For easier interpretation, I refer SAC group as state absolute control 
group, SRC group as state relative control group and SWC group as state weak control 
group. The lower the proportion of state shareholding is defined to have higher DPR, and 




From hypotheses 1 to 10, I compare various corporate governance aspects across company 
groups demarcated according to their proportions of state shareholding. From hypotheses 
11 to 21, the relationship between corporate governance and performance is tested. All the 
figures described in this chapter, if not specifically stated, come from the descriptive 
analysis of my study based on the data of 813 China listed companies from various 
resources that I shall report in the next chapter.  
 
Part One: Corporate governance difference  
 
3.1 Corporate governance difference on ownership concentration and 
structure  
 
Concentrated ownership has a profound implication on corporate governance. In China, 
ownership concentration is not a spontaneous process pushed by the market, instead, the 
state acts as the "shareholder" on a large scale influences the ownership concentration and 
structure.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The less shareholding of the biggest shareholder is linked to a higher 
degree of privatization. 
 







Table 2: Descriptive Analysis of A1 
A1 Yr 1998 Yr 1997 Yr 1996 
 All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange All the samples All the samples 
N 814 418 396 709 504 
Min. .43 .43 1.28 .7 .49 
Max. 88.58 88.58 84.98 88.58 88.58 
Mean 45.07 45.44 44.68 44.71 43.45 
Stdev. 18.23 18.19 18.29 18.15 18.08 
 
As to the end of 1998, 60.8% of 814 companies in the study have top shareholder’s 
shareholding proportion more than five times as many as that of the second biggest 
shareholder. 46.6% of these 494 companies reached more than 10 times, 15.9% are over 
100 times. This shows "one steersman controls the canoe" is very common. And most of 
the time the biggest shareholders are state shareholders (The research center of the Central 
Government, 1998).  
 
Because of the state's historical status in the company and the insider control problem, the 
top shareholders often have complete control powers of the companies, though they 
sometimes have not enough shares. Moreover, it is disclosed the state is often over-
represented on the Board (Xu & Wang, 1997), the result is other shareholders often lack 
of motivation in the company management. The average fraction of top shareholders’ 
shareholding was slightly rising from year 1996 to 1998, meanwhile, the standard 
deviations of the samples are increasing too and it shows the biggest shareholder of some 
companies strengthened their control while some others loosed their control extent. But, to 
strengthen top shareholder’s control is a stronger tendency. Shanghai Exchange has a 
higher maximum and mean value than Shenzhen Exchange. The phenomenon may be 





Hypothesis 2: A lower ownership concentration is linked to a higher degree of 
privatization. 
 
The often used variables of ownership concentration are A10 (percentage of shares 
controlled by the top 10 shareholders) and HERF (the sum of squared percentage of shares 
controlled by each top 10 shareholder). In China, the total shareholding of first 5 biggest 
shareholders already reaches 59.1% on the average; shareholders besides the top 5 have 
few control rights on the companies.. Therefore, I use the first 5 biggest shareholders’ 
total shareholding proportion as the proxy (A5), which is also used by Demsetz & Lehn 
(1985) and Cable (1985).  
Table 3: Descriptive Analysis of A5 
A5 Yr 1998 Yr 1997 Yr 1996 
 All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange All the samples All the samples 
N 814 418 396 717 511 
Min. .74 .74 17.82 .00 .00 
Max. 97.17 96.56 97.17 98.65 98.47 
Mean 59.09 59.24 58.94 58.39 57.84 
Stdev. 14.77 15.29 14.23 16.52 17.38 
 
 
Because of the different company formation processes, less privatized firms will have 
their shares subscribed by a limited number of legal shareholders besides the state. While 
more privatized firms, such as Collective Enterprises (CEs) and Town Villige Enterprises 
(TVEs), have less state shares, they tend to have relatively more legal persons to subscribe 
their shares. But still only a few legal persons are able to control big proportions of shares 
because many legal persons are constrained by their limited size and capital, especially 
TVEs. In 1996, the 5 largest shareholders accounting for 58% of the outstanding shares, 




1997). The proportion of the 5 largest shareholders’ shares has constantly increased since 
1996, reaching 59.09% in 1998. The standard deviations of the samples have a constant 
and fairly big decrease as well. It shows increasing concentration degree is a general trend. 
The maximum and mean fraction of firms’ 5 biggest shareholders’ shareholding in 
Shenzhen exchange are both slightly higher than those of Shanghai exchange.   
 
 
Hypothesis 3: A more diversified ownership among the biggest shareholders is linked to a 
higher degree of privatization. 
 
This hypothesis looks a bit like another expression of ownership concentration, but they 
are different. If a firm’s ownership is concentrated, as the total of the first 5 or 10 biggest 
shareholders' proportions is high, the control rights can also be diversified if the 
proportions of their shareholding are close to each other, that is, the shares are evenly 
distributed. By the same reason, a firm can also have a low ownership concentration even 
if the control rights is not diversified, as the biggest shareholders' proportion is much 
bigger than that of the rest of the 4 or 9 shareholders. This is a new approach to test the 
control rights to suit the phenomenon “one steersman controls the canoe" in China’s listed 
companies. Suppose the ownership is diversified, the state need not hold majority shares 
but fewer shares to take a relative control.  
 
I use the standard deviation of the top 5 shareholders' share proportions to measure the 
ownership diversification (DIV). It is obtained by rooting the average of squared 




that some differences are negative and others are positive). I choose top 5 shareholders 
corresponding to the test on ownership concentration.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive Analysis of DIV 
 
DIV Yr 1998 Yr 1997 Yr 1996 
 All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange All the samples All the samples 
N 814 418 396 709 504 
Min. .16 .16 1.79 .3 .14 
Max. 43.16 39.43 43.16 39.58 39.58 
Mean 19.46 19.57 19.34 19.08 18.47 
Stdev. 8.6 8.46 8.76 8.53 8.44 
 
The diversification slightly increased from year 1996 to year 1998, with an increasing 




Hypothesis 4a: A higher proportion of legal person shares are linked to a higher degree 
of privatization. 
Hypothesis 4b: A higher proportion of tradable A-shares are linked to a higher degree of 
privatization.  
 
I use fraction of legal person shares (FLP) and fraction of tradable A-shares (FTA) as 
variables for ownership structure. They are calculated as the volumes of legal person 








Table 5: Descriptive Analysis of FLP 
FLP All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange Yr 1997 Yr 1996 Yr 1995 
N 814 418 396 718 511 310 
Min. .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Max. 88.58 88.58 81.82 86.38 89.36 91.32 
Mean 29.54 28.91 30.21 27.57 26.99 27.55 
Stdev. 27.08 27.37 26.79 25.67 24.73 26 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Analysis of FTA 
 
FTA All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange Yr 1997 Yr 1996 Yr 1995 
N 814 418 396 718 512 310 
Min. 1.47 2.3 1.47 .00 .00 2.39 
Max. 100 100 69.06 100 100 100 
Mean 30.78 30.18 31.4 30.38 30.09 31.06 
Stdev. 13.08 14.62 11.22 13.63 15.07 17.6 
  
 
When the capital is constrained, more privatized firms are likely to have bigger 
proportions of individual shares gathering money from the markets. On the other hand, 
when the proportion of state shares decrease; the proportions of legal person shares and 
individual shares are likely to increase. From year 1996 to year 1998, fraction of legal 
person shares increased from 27.62% to 30.74%, the fraction of Tradable A-shares 
increased from 30% to 30.78%. However, at the end of year 1998, 55% of the sample 
companies’ A-shares are less than 30% of the total equities, only 6.8% companies have 
fraction of A-shares higher than 50%, i.e. in a dominant status.  
 
3.2 Corporate governance difference on company control 
 
Since the board is the front-line control mechanism to reduce agency problems (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983) and the CEO is the chief 'agent' that manages the company (Andrews & 




because the data of how the boards and CEOs come into being are not available due to the 
"black box operation", I can only study the situation as of today.  
 
Hypothesis 5: A lower insider control degree on Board is related to a higher degree of 
privatization. 
 
Many researchers in China believe the insider control problem resulted from historical and 
systemic reasons, especially the control rights expanding in the reform (Hussain & 
Zhuang, 1998). Since a lot of listed companies are transferred from SOEs, whose shares 
are partly hold by the state at present, there may have some kind of relation between the 
insider control and privatization degree. He (1998) points out the insider control degree 
seems related to the concentration of state shares and legal person shares. Though he did 
not empirically test the speculation, He (1998) proposes an indicator to measure insider 
control degree. It is the number of insiders on the board divided by the total number of 
directors. 
 
I use insider control degree (ICD) to measure the degree of insider control on the Board. I 
define insiders as the Board directors, who also take the managerial positions in the 
company. Some companies went listed almost the same time as they are built by their 
controlling enterprises; they only have prospective personnel and positions in the 
prospectus. In this case, I count the managers according to their prospective positions 
because only minor change will be done on that. As for the leaders in the controlling firms 
or parent firms of the listed companies, though they may be quite influential on the 




level firms, thus, they are not counted as insiders. Positions are all the positions in the 
company, besides CEOs, department managers as well as employee representatives are 
also included. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Analysis of ICD 
 
ICD Yr 1998 Yr 1997 Yr 1996 
 All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange All the samples All the samples 
N 800 415 385 202 202 
Min.  .00 .00 .00 .00 .05 
Max. 1 1 1 1 1 
Mean .49 .46 .53 .56 .56 
Stdev. .27 .24 .3 .27 .26 
 
 
At the end of 1998, the mean insider control degree of all the listed companies in China is 
49.5%.  That is to say, on the average, in every company, about half of the directors are 
also managers at the same time.  
 
Hypothesis 6: A lower insider control degree on Supervision Committee is linked to a 
higher degree of privatization. 
 
The variable for insiders on Supervision Committee (ISC) is the same as ICD. ISC is 
counted as the insiders on the supervision committee divided by the number of all the 
members.  
Table 8: Descriptive Analysis of ISC 
 
ISC Yr 1998 Yr 1997 Yr 1996 
 All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange All the samples All the samples 
N 796 415 381 202 202 
Min. .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Max. 1 1 1 1 1 
Mean .51 .58 .44 .38 .57 




Outsiders in supervision committee have the advantage of their expertise and their 
independent status. Since they have no positions in the company, they have no scruple in 
checking the errors. The prerequisite is that listed companies have the incentive to let the 
supervision committee function in that way. Since there is no tradition of strong power 
constraint mechanism in SOEs, the inside inspection department in a company is merely a 
decoration because it is not very possible for a lower level official to supervise the higher 
level managers and a department to supervise the host it depends on. Therefore, whether 
there are enough outsiders in the supervision committee is an important matter. In a firm 
corporatized from a former SOE, supervision committee is liable to fall into a power 
balance tool. If there is any problem in distributing power or any party wants to be 
represented, all right, let them enter the Supervision Committee. Insiders that cannot enter 
the board and representatives of employees are two main personnel sources of the 
committee.  
 
The mean insider control degree on supervision committee was 51% in 1998, slightly 
higher than insider control degree on the board.  
 
Hypothesis 7: A smaller number of Party leaders are linked to a higher degree of 
privatization. 
 
To have Party organizations in the companies is a very unique phenomenon in China. 
Wang (1995) argues it reflects state’s control over organizational mechanism. In the 




follow legal procedures to generate Chairman and CEO, but most likely the so-called 
upper-level departments have serious interference on that. And almost 40% enterprises are 
obviously constrained in generating their leaders. Also, the degree of interference in 
personnel appointments is more serious in restructured old enterprises and enterprises that 
corporatized from state enterprises than in newly built enterprises and enterprises 
corporatized from non-state firms.  
 
Number of Party leaders on board (NPL) is counted as the number of board members, 
who has the title of Party position, approximately, only the Party secretary and vice-
secretary positions are mentioned if this information is reported in the companies’ annual 
reports.  
 
Table 9: Descriptive Analysis of NPL 
NPL Yr 1998 Yr 1997 Yr 1996 
 All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange All the samples All the samples 
N 308 42 266 86 95 
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 
Max. 7 7 3 2 3 
Mean .58 1.19 .48 .45 .4 
Stdev. .81 1.12 .72 .71 .66 
 
As of the end of 1998, Shanghai market has a mean which is two times bigger than that of 
Shenzhen market, and the number of Party leaders in newly listed companies of Shanghai 
market was higher than that of Shenzhen market every year. Since the corporatized SOEs 
and the newly built companies in which state takes the leading role often have more Party 






3.3 Corporate governance difference on incentives 
Jenkinson (1998) argues the longer term benefits of privatization are likely to depend 
upon whether the process of transferring ownership to the private sector provides stronger 
incentives to efficiency than that existing under public ownership. The World Bank (1997) 
emphasizes that incentives have to be redefined so as to bring them into line with the 
principal’s objectives. Meanwhile, Huang and Zhang (1995) concur there is an "incentive 
vacuum" for the agents of the former SOEs in China, first because the managers are 
government officials, the evaluation standards from the Party are more than only 
performance and efficiency. Second, because of the incomplete market system and 
immature market mechanism, managers neither get the pressure from the stock’s price in 
the market, nor worry about possible takeovers. Third, because of the multi-layered 
principal-agent relationship, the ultimate owner hardly has effective incentives on 
managers because of the information asymmetry and the possible dual collusion (Jiang, 
1994; Zhai, 1995). But, the accountability and transparency of the compensation 
mechanism in China’s listed companies have got some improvement, despite the little 
improvement on organizational mechanism.  
 
Hypothesis 8: A higher reported annual salary of the CEO is linked to a higher degree of 
privatization. 
 









Table 10: Descriptive Analysis of RAU 
 
RAU Yr 1998 Yr 1997 Yr 1996 
 All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange All the samples All the samples 
N 728 386 342 Na Na 
Min. .00 .00 .78 Na Na 
Max. 59.2 20.6 59.2 Na Na 
Mean 5.01 4.68 5.4 Na Na 
Stdev. 5.15 3.32 6.61 Na Na 
 
Since directors in state controlling companies are treated as representatives of state assets, 
and administrated in a governmental category, they are paid based on the official ranks. Of 
course, reported salary does not equal to the directors' real revenue, the various privileges 
and consumption on the position are not counted in. But the data is not available for 
further test. In contrast, managers of more privatized firms are supposed to have less 
scruple in disclosing their revenue, especially when it is a private company.  This is 
reflected in the comparison of two markets. The highest reported salary is from company 
in Shenzhen market, 59 thousand yuan annually, almost 3 times as much as that of 
Shanghai market; the average reported salary is also 115% as much as that of Shanghai 
market. However, the standard deviation of the samples from the two markets is quite low; 
it shows that most of the companies pay their mangers around the average level. 
 
Hypothesis 9: A higher fraction of managerial shareholding is linked to a higher 
privatization degree. 
 
I use MGS to represent proportion of managerial shares. (After data screening, it is the 






Table 11: Descriptive Analysis of MGS 
MGS Yr 1998 Yr 1997 Yr 1996 
 All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange All the samples All the samples 
N 796 415 384 201 200 
Min. .00 1 2 .00 .00 
Max. 207.8 15 10 42 77.63 
Mean 6.53 4.44 4.3 3.75 3.74 
Stdev. 13.23 1.57 1.33 6.18 7.99 
 
I mentioned the directors and managers in state controlling companies hold so few shares 
that are not proportionate to their control rights at all. While in more privatized firms, if 
the directors are not the representatives of the state, as in CEs, TVEs or Joint Ventures, 
theoretically they should be nominated by the General Meeting. And CEs and TVEs are 
owned by group of people, who are the personalized owners of the assets, "Zero 
directors 13 " phenomenon should less likely to happen. Another reason of the low 
proportion of managerial shares in SOEs may because of the big size of the former SOEs, 
sometimes a small proportion of shareholding means a large amount of shares.  
 
Hypothesis 10: A smaller Supervision Committee size is linked to a higher degree of 
privatization. 
 
This is based on two assumptions: first, in state controlling companies, the Supervision 
Committee should supervise state assets to preserve and increase their value, in addition to 
protecting the benefit of shareholders, while in more privatized firms, this is not an 
outstanding task. Thus, on Supervision Committee in state controlling companies, there 
will be personnel from a variety of government departments to represent their interest, 




direct interference should be less. Second, since a supervision committee is sometimes 
used as a power balance tool in the process of corporatization, considering the overstaffing 
problem in SOEs, a supervision committee will settle a large number of heads there. 
 
I use SSC to represent the size of supervision committee, i.e. total number of the members.  
Table 12: Descriptive Analysis of SSC 
 
 
SSC Yr 1998 Yr 1997 Yr 1996 
 All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange All the samples All the samples 
N 799 415 384 203 202 
Min. 1 1 2 1 2 
Max. 15 15 10 9 9 
Mean 4.37 4.44 4.3 4.25 4.38 
Stdev. 1.46 1.57 1.33 1.3 1.4 
 
 
Part Two: The relationship between corporate governance and companies' 
performance 
 
The influence of ownership distribution on corporate governance has been much studied. 
One approach is to study actual individual firm performance, changes in its management, 
and other measures, and related this to (changes in) ownership. This approach has been 
used by, among many others, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Megginson et al. (1994) and 
Denis and Denis (1995); of which, research of Megginson et al. (1994) is a very 
meaningful experiment to operationalize the changes accompanied with the privatization 
process. However, it is difficult to use in the context of formerly centrally planned 
economies. Specifically, in addition to the fact that only ex-post data will be available, 
                                                                                                                                                                              




they are often of poor quality, with a considerable time lag. An alternative approach is to 
study share price behavior. In a forward-looking market, prices of firms incorporate the 
effects of ownership and corporate governance on future firm performance. This approach 
has been often used in developed market economies.  
 
Some researchers have been trying to find out the relationship between the degree of 
privatization and the performance of the privatized SOEs. Of the few quantitative analyses 
on privatization, the research of Andrews & Dowling (1998) is different from the direction 
on whether privatization tends to enhance firm financial performance. It tries to reveal the 
strategic choices that differentiated firms with superior post-privatization performance 
from those with inferior post-privatization performance concerning the shareholding the 
state remains in the firms. It sheds light on the research in China’s case, where state 
shareholding is prevalent as partial divestiture.  
 
The relationship between corporate governance and companies' performance has been 
carefully examined and voluminous results have been attained, however, fewer studies 
have done in the context of transition economies, and fewer focus on China, Xu & Wang 
(1997), Chen (1998) are two of them. They both use empirical approaches to study 
Chinese stock market and both only focus on the ownership aspect. My hypotheses 
comprise the relationship between corporate governance and performance more than 






I employ three ratios to measure the firms’ performance, the market-to-book value ratio 
(MBR), ROA and EPS. MBR is the market-to-book value ratio, that is, share prices on the 
last trading day of each year multiply the number of total outstanding shares divided by 
the book value of equity. Other two accounting rates, ROA and EPS, are employed as 
supplementary measures. ROA is the return on assets, after tax profits divided by the book 
value of total assets. EPS is the earning per share, net profit divided by total shares. In the 
empirical literatures (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; Claessens et al., 1997), Tobin's Q, the market 
value of debt plus the market value of equity divided by the replacement cost of all assets, 
has been used as a major indicator of firms' performance. Since few of the Chinese stock 
companies issue debt securities, it is almost impossible to estimate the market value of the 
companies' debt. Information needed to calculate the replacement cost is not available 
either. Smith (1996) reports that institutional investors in the US use the market-to-book 
ratio to assess performance when selecting target firms.  
Table 13: Descriptive Analysis of MBR 
MBR All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange Yr 1997 Yr 1996 Yr 1995 
N 782 417 365 718 513 310 
Min. -18.61 1.38 -18.61 .00 .00 .00 
Max. 42.18 31.52 42.18 61.51 36.99 10.12 
Mean 4.45 4.38 4.54 4.73 4.12 2.26 
Stdev. 3.3 2.53 3.99 3.48 2.25 1.28 
 
 
Table 14: Descriptive Analysis of ROA 
ROA All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange Yr 1997 Yr 1996 Yr 1995 
N 718 513 308 815 419 396 
Min. -.43 -1.18 -.154 -0.5 -.31 -.503 
Max. .836 1.44 -.371 -.38 .38 .248 
Mean .0058 .15 .005 .0045 .005 .004 





Table 15: Descriptive Analysis of EPS 
EPS All the samples Shanghai Exchange   Shenzhen Exchange Yr 1997 Yr 1996 Yr 1995 
N 814 419 395 718 512 309 
Min. -2.54 -2.54 -2.19 -1.68 -2.1 -.85 
Max. 1.73 1.17 1.73 1.71 2.07 2.28 
Mean .22 .24 .2 .26 .27 .26 
Stdev. .34 .29 .37 .30 .31 .29 
 
 
3.4 Performance difference on different ownership concentration and 
structure  
 
Ownership concentration and ownership structure are two entangled problems. Ownership 
concentration mainly concerns the biggest shareholders, though, their nature should be 
considered, ownership structure concerns the shares in general, however, the controlling 
status of a firm is not completely decided by the added-up shares alone, as the difference 
of diversification and concentration should also be considered.  
 
A) The biggest shareholders    
 
Hypothesis 11: A higher proportion of the top shareholder’s shareholding is linked to a 
higher performance. 
 
At the end of 1998, there is no listed company whose biggest holder is an individual, 
which means the largest shareholders are either the state or legal persons. As of year 1998, 




30.74% and 30.78% of the total equities respectively in China. 51.6% companies of all 
samples have state shares below 30%, 19% companies have state shares between 30% and 
50%, 29.4% companies have state shares higher than 50%. That is to say, 3 of 10 
companies have state shares in predominant status (more than 50%); while from year 
1995 to 1997 there are always more than 33% companies under state absolute control. 
Based on the assumption that the degree of state shareholding will affect the corporate 
governance aspects of the companies, whether the biggest shareholder has an absolute, 
relative or weak control should affect the performance of the companies. 
 
Hypothesis 12: A higher degree of concentration of ownership is linked to a higher 
performance.  
 
Some researchers have already had some studies in the context of transition economies. 
For example, Classens et al. (1997) find a positive relationship between concentrated 
ownership and performance proxies. In China, Xu and Wang (1997) observe that in 1995 
in Shenzhen Exchange, only 7 out of 127 companies’ five largest shareholders have 
individual shareholders. And on the average, there are only 1.6 individual shareholders 
included in the top 10 shareholders of the companies, and these individuals only have 
3.4% of total outstanding shares. It is quite reasonable to conclude that in China, the 
ownership concentration should be interpreted as state and legal person ownership 
concentration, rather than ownership concentration in general. Xu & Wang (1997) find a 
positive and significant relationship between firms' performance and ownership 




there is no significant correlation. To find out how the theory suits China’s case will be 
very meaningful.  
 
Hypothesis 13: A higher ownership diversification of the biggest shareholders is linked to 
a higher Performance.  
 
Many researchers suggest ownership diversification and further withdrawal of state 
ownership in listed companies, but this hypothesis has not been tested before. Ownership 
diversification is supposed to have a very big effect on firms' corporate governance. When 
ownership is both concentrated and diversified among the biggest shareholders, each 
shareholder should have incentive as well as capability to care about firms' situation, 
insider control problem may be overcome to some extent. If the state’s acting as the 
biggest shareholder will offset the positive effects of concentration, diversification maybe 
a way out. In fact, many of the appeals for ownership diversification in China are pointing 
to state controlling companies. While for legal person shares, it is advocated large legal 
persons should be better cultivated and more involved in the management because of their 
stronger stimulation and capability.  
 
B) Ownership structure    
The findings of Xu & Wang (1997) indicate there should be some difference when the 
shareholders are treated as groups of different nature or solely be treated as controlling 






Hypothesis 14: A higher proportion of legal person shares are linked to a higher 
performance.  
  
Xu and Wang (1997) find there is a strong positive correlation between the market value 
and the total proportion of legal person shares; it appears that the market recognizes the 
role of legal person as a group. However, Chen (1998) finds no significant correlation 
between legal person shares and performance. In China, besides the state, legal person is 
the most promising group to be the large shareholder in the listed companies. To find out 
whether it is helpful for the performance improvement is very important.  
 
Hypothesis 15: A higher proportion of tradable A-shares are linked to a higher 
performance.  
 
Despite the big divergence between Xu & Wang (1997) and Chen (1998), they both 
disclose the passive or non-relevant effect of tradable A-shares. Since this is one of the 
bases for the choice between institutional privatization and individual privatization, it has 
to be tested. 
 
3.5 Performance difference on different firm control  
 





Chen (1998) tries to test the effects of insiders and concludes that the relationship between 
insider control and corporate performance does not exist in listed firms in China. But his 
study ends in 1995. After 4 years since 1995, I find insider control is becoming more overt 
and theoretically it is a problem believed to harm the efficiency. Also, Chen (1998) use 
variables as legal person shares and state shares as proxies for insider control, which are 
very general and problematic. I shall use different variables to test the hypothesis and 
expect to get a different result.  
 
Hypothesis 17: A lower Insider control degree on Supervision Committee is linked to a 
higher performance.  
 
More outsiders in Supervision Committee can provide a breadth of knowledge, experience 
and objectivity to carry out their tasks in the interest of shareholders. They provide 
“checks and balances” on management and act as professional referees and experts in 
internal organizational control. Since they are in an independent status, they have the 
capacity to supervise managers, and they have the incentive to develop their reputations as 
experts to increase their value in managerial labor market.  
 
Hypothesis 18: A smaller number of Party leaders on the Board are linked to a higher 
performance.  
 
If the manager is appointed by the Party, or has the title as a Party leader, he is 
administrated and evaluated according to not only economic standards but also other 




objectives. When the requirements from upper-level departments do not agree with each 
other, the obscure and sometimes contradicting goals are supposed to affect efficiency. 
 
3.6 Performance difference on different incentives  
 
Hypothesis 19: A higher level of reported annual salary of the managers is linked to a 
higher performance.  
 
If the theory of compensation mechanism and organizational mechanism is right, the 
result should not be significant. Because in SOEs, though the pay is quite low, managers 
have abundant invisible on-position consumption, which cannot be accurately disclosed 
and calculated. Only if the personal revenues are revealed and under supervision, bond 
with the performance of the company, reported annual salary will show relationship with 
performance.  
 
Hypothesis 20: A higher proportion of managerial shareholding is linked to a higher 
performance.  
 
One of the motivations for privatization is that state shares have no personalized owners 
and serious principal-agent problem may occur when the owner is absent. One of the 
benefits of privatization is to relate managers and directors’ interests to firms' competitive 
status more closely. Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell & Servaes (1990) both provide 




significant and positive at this stage. In China, the managerial shareholding proportion is 
very low, the maximum value in 1998 of all the listed companies was 2.08% (Exclude the 
cases that private capital is controlled by legal persons). The experiment of other reform 
measures, such as stock option is ongoing in China now.  
 
Hypothesis 21: A smaller size of supervision committee is linked to a higher performance.  
 
As I described earlier, the supervision committee is only a cosmetic as a part of the 
modern corporate form, crammed by insiders and irrelevant parties, who have no incentive 
and capacity to supervise the directors and managers in the interest of the stockholders. 
Only if the Supervision Committee is no longer the tool to balance power and its size is 
cut, it will function effectively and be helpful for better performance.  
 
The research model and all the hypotheses and are summarized in Figure 1.  
 
Some other factors will affect the degree of privatization. In China’s context, these factors 
include Age, Size and Industry. To take them into account, I introduce three variables: 
IND, SIZE and AGE. Industry (IND): industry is decided according to 5 big standard 
categories of listed companies disclosed in the authorized newspapers as China Security 
and Security Times. 1 represents manufacturing; 2 represents commerce; 3 represents real 
estate; 4 represents utilities and 5 represents conglomerates.  Follow most of the previous 
studies, (e.g., Morck et al, 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990), SIZE is calculated as the 
function of Logarithm of total assets based on 10. I calculate the years from the list date to 




Chapter Four: Methodology and Results 
 
4.1 Summary of variables  
Figure 2: Summary of Variables 
 
variable                                                                       Description 
Ownership variables (8) 
A1                                               Percentage of shares controlled by  the biggest shareholder 
A5                                               Percentage of shares controlled by top 5 shareholders 
DIV                                             Standard Deviation of the top 5 shareholders' share proportions 
FST                                             The fraction of shares held by the State  
FLP                                             The fraction of shares held by Legal Persons 
FTA                                            The fraction of shares held by Tradable A share investors 
DPR                                            Degree of Privatization, grouped into absolute control, relative 
                                                    and weak state control according to FST 
 
Control rights and Incentive variables (8) 
ICD                                              No. of inside directors on Board/ total no. of directors on Board 
ICS                                               No. of inside directors on Board/ total no. of directors on 
                                                     Supervision Committee 
NPL                                             No. of Party leaders on Board 
RAU                                            Reported annuity of the CEOs 
MGS                                            Managerial shares i.e. Percentage of shares hold by directors and  managers 
SSC                                              Size of Supervision Committee i.e. total number of Committee members  
 
Variables of Performance (3) 
MBR                                             Market-to-book value ratio, share prices on the last trading day of 
                                                      each year time the number of total outstanding shares divided by 
                                                      the book value of equity 
ROA                                              Return on assets, after tax profits divided by the book value of 
                                                       total assets 
EPS                                                Earning per share, net profit divided by total shares 
 
Other Variables (3) 
AGE                                               The years since the firm is listed to Dec. 1998 
SIZE                                               Logged value of firms' total assets 
IND                                                1,2,3,4,5 represents industries of manufacturing, trade, utility, real 




4.2 Data Description  
I use data from year 1995 to 1998. The reason I start from 1995 is because many 




major tax reform and largely decreased fiscal subsidies to loss-making SOEs. The status 
of the Central Bank was strengthened; the four major state specialized banks became 
commercialized; and the national-level 100-firm corporatization experiment was 
announced in the same year. Also, starting in July 1993, the central bank imposed a tight 
monetary policy to fight inflation. As a consequence, inflation was reduced from 21% in 
1994 to 6% in 1996. In the following years, it has gone to below 2%. (Appendix 3) This 
assures the comparability of data across the years in this research.   
 
I have the data of 310 listed companies in year 1995, 515 in 1996, 718 in 1997 and 826 in 
1998. I obtained most of the data for ownership structure and performance indicators from 
China Listed Company Reports 1999. China Chenxin Security Evaluation Co. Ltd. and 
Shanghai Public Finance Security Company edited the book. Some other data are from the 
Prospectuses of the listed companies. 
 
I obtain most of the figures on ownership, firm control and incentive variables of more 
than 800 listed companies from the full-length Annual Reports of year 1998, published by 
Security Times. I record the prices of stocks on the last trading day every year from the 
periodical publications of CSRC (China’s Securities Regulatory Committee), the SHSE 
(Shanghai Stock Exchange) and SZSE (Shenzhen Stock Exchange). They include China 
Securities Annual Report, 1998; SHSE Securities Yearbook, 1995 to 1998; and SZSE Fact 
Book, 1995 to 1998. The data on ownership concentration are from the official 





Other resources include China Statistical Yearbook, 1995 to 1998, China Securities and 
Futures Statistical Yearbook, 1998, edited by CSRC, China Security and Security Times. 
 
The constraints of the accessibility of data resource are many, for instance, I only have the 
full lengthy annual reports of listed companies in year 1998. The variables concerning 
corporate governance, such as RAU (Reported Annual Salary), MGS (Managerial Shares), 
NPL (Number of Party Leaders), ICD (Inside Control Degree on the Board), ISC (Inside 
Control Degree in the Supervision Committee) and SSC (Size of Supervision Committee), 
can only be attained from annual reports and prospectuses. However, prospectuses only 
reflect the situation when the company is listed, the situation of other years is not available. 
Therefore, I only get incomplete data of the variables mentioned above, about the newly 
listed companies every year from 1995 to 1997. For year 1995, I do not have complete 
data for ownership concentration variables.  
 
4.3 Methodology 
Although there is a large body of literature on privatization, there are a limited number of 
quantitative studies on the subject. Few studies are on the correlation between 
privatization and corporate governance, large proportion of studies focus on the 
performance comparison before and after large-scale privatization. 
 
Boubakri & Cosset (1998) and Megginson et. al (1995) use Wilcoxon signed-rank test to 
test the median difference in variable values between the pre and post-privatization 




experiencing changes in a given direction is greater than would be expected by chance. 
Among the articles that search for the reasons that underlying the improved performance 
after privatization, Andrews & Dowling (1998) uses Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test to see 
whether the distributions of the sub-samples are similar; they use Fischer’s Exact Test to 
compare differences in two categorical variables. They also use chi-square test to 
determine the usefulness of the control variables.  
 
Data constraint is a big problem in studying privatization. First, companies under 
privatization program have to be either “completed” or “underway”, rather than planned, 
thus small sample is often resulted (Andrews & Dowling, 1998). Megginson et. al (1994), 
as an example, spend one year to collect data from 149 candidate companies, only the data 
of 61 companies are achieved. Second, because the immature and incomplete market 
context in most of the developing countries under the scheme of privatization, non-
comparable pre- and post-divestment can not be included in the financial and operating 
analyses in addition to data missing.  The reasons Megginson et. al (1994) mention 
include the firm’s been broken up prior to privatization; the major accounting change; 
merge and acquisition shortly after privatization; the unclear divestiture date and the 
government’s still holding voting shares. Third, the data obtained are often not normally 
distributed even the sample size is fairly big, parametric tests cannot be used.  
 
Besides non-parametric tests, regression is often used to test the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance. But as Frydman (1997) points out, the evidence of 




Germany. Few empirical studies have been done in transition economy, because 
significant result cannot be obtained from the constrained data.  
 
In this study, I use non-parametric tests because the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and 
Shapiro-Wirk test show the data are not normally distributed. From hypotheses 1 to 10, I 
use the Kruskal-Wallis test because I test the corporate governance difference over 3 
groups of firms with different privatization degree (SAC, SRC and SWC). From 
hypotheses 11 to 22, I use Mann-Whitney test because I test the performance difference 
over 2 groups of firms categorized according to each corporate governance variable. I also 
use Mann-Whitney test in term of AGE and SIZE on two groups categorized by corporate 
governance and performance variables and Kruskal-Wallis test in term of IND on 5 
groups categorized by industries. 
 
4.4 Report on results 
The reported results include: 1) Descriptive analysis from 1995 to 1998, which is reported 
in the last chapter. 2) The overall results of hypotheses test on corporate governance 
difference. 3) The overall results of hypotheses test on performance difference. 4) Degree 
of Privatization and corporate governance statistics on all the samples by Kruskal-Wallis 
test from 1995 to 1998. 5) Degree of privatization and corporate governance statistics on 
Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. 6) Age, size and industry analysis on corporate 
governance variables from 1996 to 1998. 7) Correlation of corporate governance and 
performance on all samples from 1996 to 1998. 8) Correlation of corporate governance 




analysis on performance variables from 1996 to 1998. 10) Mean ranks report on corporate 
governance variables in 1998. 11) Mean ranks report on performance variables in 1998. 
12) The overall results of age, size and industry.  
Table 16: The results of hypotheses test14
(Year 1996-1998) 
(Corporate Governance Difference between 3 Groups with different privatization degree  α=0.1) 
 
Hypotheses                All the samples               Shanghai Market           Shenzhen Market  
 1998 1997 1996  1998 1997 1996  1998 1997 1996
H1(A1) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
H2(A5) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
H3(DIV) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
H4(FLP) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
H4(FTA) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
H5(ICD) √ √ √ √ √ √ + √ √ 
H6(ISC) √ + + √ + + √ + + 
H7(NPL) √ + + + NA NA √ NA NA 
H8(RAU) √ NA NA √ NA NA √ NA NA 
H9(MGS) √ + + √ + + + + + 
H10(SSC) + + + + + + + + + 
          
 
Table 17: The results of hypotheses test 
(Year 1998) 
(Performance Difference between 2 Groups on difference corporate governance variables  α=0.1) 
 
Variables       All the samples              Shanghai Market          Shenzhen Market   
 MBR ROA EPS MBR ROA EPS MBR ROA EPS 
H11(A1) √ √ √ + √ √ √ √ √ 
H12(A5) √ √ + + √ + + √ + 
H13(DIV) √ √ √ + √ √ + √ √ 
H14(DPR) √ √ + + √ + + + + 
H15(FLP) √ + + √ + + √ + + 
H16(FTA) + + √ + + √ √ + + 
H17(ICD) √ + + √ + + + + + 
H18(ISC) √ + √ √ + √ √ + + 
H19(NPL) + √ + + + + + √ √ 
H20(RAU) + + + + + √ + + + 
H21(MGS) √ √ √ √ √ √ + √ √ 
H22(SSC) √ √ √ √ + + √ + √ 
    
 
 
                                                          
14 v means the hypothesis has got significant result, + means the hypothesis has no significant result. NA means no 





Table 18: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis results on the corporate governance and 
performance variables over time in term of AGE, SIZE and IND 
(All the samples) α=0.1 
 
   Variables                       AGE 15                              SIZE                                 IND16
                             1998      1997       1996             1998        1997      1996               1998       1997      1996    
                
    A1                       √ 17       √             +                     √             √             +                  √            √             √ 
                              
    A5                       √           √             +                     +             +            +                   √            √             √ 
                             
   DIV                      √           √             +                     √             √            +                   √             √            √ 
                           
   FST                      +            +            +                     √             +            √                   √             √            √ 
  
   FLP                      +            +            +                     √             √            √                   √             √            √ 
  
   FTA                     √            √            √                      √            √            +                   √             √            √ 
  
   ICD                      √           NA.        NA.                 +            +            √                   √             +            + 
                              
   ISC                       √          NA.         NA.                +             +            √                   √             +            + 
                              
   NPL                      √          NA.         NA.                √             +            +                   +             +            √ 
                              
  RAU                      √           NA.        NA.                 √            NA.       NA.                √           NA.       NA. 
                              
   MGS                     √            +            NA.                √             +             √                   √             √            + 
                             
   SSC                      +             +            NA.                  +            +             +                   √             +            √ 
                             
  MBR                     √             √            √                    √            √            √                     √            √            +  
 
  ROA                     √             √             √                     √            √             √                   √            √            √ 
                             
  EPS                       √             √             √                     √            √             +                  √             √            √ 









                                                          
15 Age and SIZE are automatically recoded into two groups in the respective test, Group 1 includes 50 percent of the 
cases with smaller value, Group 2 includes the rest 50 percent with bigger value. 
16 IND is recoded into 5 groups, according to the 5 industries: manufacturing, commerce, real-estate, utilities and 
conglomerates, kruskal-Wallis test is used. 






Chapter Five: Analysis of Results 
 
 
In this chapter, I analyze the empirical results or hypotheses testing presented in chapter 
three.  For each hypothesis, the result of all the samples is analyzed first, followed by the 
results from Shanghai and Shenzhen market respectively. I summarize the findings first by 
giving out the significance level and the mean rank sequence of the groups, followed by 
discussion of the implications of the findings. 
 
Part One: Hypotheses about corporate governance difference  
In this part, the tests are based on three groups with different privatization degrees. 
Companies with a proportion of state share above 50%, between 30% and 50%, and below 
50% fall in to SAC group (state absolute control group), SRC group (state relative control 
group) and SWC (state weak control group) respectively. The mean ranks of the groups 
are symbolized as M1, M2, and M3 respectively. That is, M1 is the mean rank of the least 
privatized group, M3 is the mean rank of the most privatized group, and M2 is the mean 
rank of the group in the middle.  
 
5.1 Corporate governance difference on ownership concentration and 
structure 
 
All the hypotheses concerning ownership concentration and ownership structure show 
highly significant results at .000 levels by Kruskal-Wallis test throughout the years. 




Table 19: Degree of privatization and A1 Statistics18
 
A1 Year 1998 Year 1997 Year 1996 Year 1995 
All samples G119 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 620.8 330.7 313.8 522.4 292.8 260.1 378.1 217.9 172.9    
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
Shanghai G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 312.8 165.2 168.2 270.0 147.5 132.9 203.7 110.2 99.9    
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
Shenzhen G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 620.8 330.7 313.8 522.4 292.8 260.1 378.1 217.9 172.9       
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
 
 
For hypothesis 1, because the Sif=0.0001< α, the top shareholder’s control degree is 
significantly different across the groups with different privatization degree. Of all the 
samples, from year 1996 to 1998, I observe M1>M2>M3, this shows a trend that the more 
privatized the firm is, the less control degree of the biggest shareholder is. Moreover, the 
M1 is almost twice as big as M2, i.e. in SAC group, the shareholding of the top 
shareholder is rather big, reflecting that state shares are quite concentrated in few state 
institutions or agents. It may be because when the state wants to absolutely control a 
company, it prefers the status of "one steersman controls the canoe” to lower the various 
agency costs. Interestingly, M2 is always mildly higher than M3. This result may indicate 
the legal persons are not always motivated or capable to be the “number one”, State still 
has the chance to control the firm without holding predominant shares. Results of 
Shanghai market are almost the same. Only in 1998, M2 is lower than M3; this shows in 
SRC group, either the state has a looser control or the legal persons are less active than 
those in SWC group are. The results of Shenzhen market are the same as those of all the 
samples.  
                                                          
18 Kruskal-Wallis Test, α=0.001 
19 G1 stands for the group of state absolute control (the less privatized), G2 stands for the group of relative control and 




Table 20: Degree of privatization and A5 Statistics20
 
A5 Year 1998 Year 1997 Year 1996 Year 1995 
All samples G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 559.2 294.8 262.1 479.2 274.6 310.7 351.9 200.2 213.4    
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
Shanghai G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 280.1 141.4 195.7 249.8 139.9 161.1 194.8 101.4 122.3    
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
Shenzhen G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 279.6 154.9 166.7 229.8 135.7 150.0 158.7 98.1 91.4       
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
 
 
For hypothesis 2, because the Sif=0.0001< α, the ownership is significantly different 
across the groups with different privatization degree. Of all the samples, M1>M3>M2, it 
is not simply the more privatized the firm is, the less concentrated the ownership is. This 
may have two interpretations. First, it may because under state relative control, the state 
suppresses legal persons’ shareholdings to a lower level; while under state weak control, 
legal persons are easier to hold more shares. Second, it may because in SRC group, the 
legal persons have no capacity or chance to take a leading role in the company, hence the 
legal persons may not be so much motivated to hold more shares. And they may remain 
less active on the operations of the company than their counterparts in SWC group are. 
Results of Shanghai and Shenzhen markets are the same. 
 
Table 21: Degree of privatization and DIV Statistics21
 
DIV Year 1998 Year 1997 Year 1996 Year 1995 
All samples G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 618.6 327.8 316.2 520.5 291.1 262.5 376.5 216.3 175.2    
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
Shanghai G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 311.7 166.2 168.5 268.7 150.2 132.4 202.9 111.0 100.2    
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
Shenzhen G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 307.1 161.4 148.5 252.3 141.2 130.5 175.0 105.3 76.0       
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
                                                          
20 Kruskal-Wallis Test 




For Hypothesis 3, because the Sif=0.0001< α, the control rights diversification among the 
biggest shareholders is significantly different across the groups with different privatization 
degree. Of all the samples, from year 1996 to 1998, M1 is almost 1.5 times as big as M2, 
also, M1>M2>M3 shows the more privatized the firm is, the more diversified the control 
rights are. It supports the inference that the shareholdings of the biggest shareholders can 
be diversified easier only if the state only has a relative or weak control. Legal persons in 
SWC group may be more motivated and capable than SRC group to share the control 
rights. This coincides with the findings on hypothesis 2 (A5), legal persons’ short of 
enthusiasm results in a higher M2 (less diversified). Results of Shanghai market are 
almost the same, except in 1998 M2<M3. It shows companies in Shanghai market in SRC 
group have more diversified ownership. It corresponds with the findings on hypothesis 1 
(A1), the top shareholder of this group also has less control rights (A1).  This is the side 
evidence that top shareholder’s control is the main hinder of diversification. Results of 
Shenzhen markets are the same as that happens on all the samples.  
 
Table 22: Degree of privatization and FLP Statistics22
 
FLP Year 1998 Year 1997 Year 1996 Year 1995 
All samples G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 161.3 332.0 579.6 157.1 321.2 536.8 121.9 231.6 381.7 74.6 128.2 232.1
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
Shanghai G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 84.5 153.7 301.1 87.7 164.3 281.6 75.7 129.7 214.4 49.5 74 138.4
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
Shenzhen G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 77.3 169.7 279 69.7 158.6 255.4 45.9 102.4 167.3 25.4 54.0 93.6 




                                                          




Table 23: Degree of privatization and FTA Statistics23
 
FTA Year 1998 Year 1997 Year 1996 Year 1995 
All samples G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 338.8 439.1 435.2 286.4 390.0 399.9 197.8 290.0 283.4 108.4 184.8 170.2
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
Shanghai G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 176.6 222.7 223.0 147.0 192.0 216.4 113.4 151.9 166.3 63.8 103.6 108.6
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
Shenzhen G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 162.6 217.3 212.7 140.7 200.8 183.9 85.6 137.6 117.4 45.5 80.5 62.2
Sig. .000 .000 .000  
 
For Hypothesis 4, because the Sif=0.0001< α, the fraction of legal person and the fraction 
of tradable A-shares are significantly different across the groups with different 
privatization degree, yet FLP and FTA have different sequences of mean ranks. Of all the 
samples, for FLP, from year 1996 to 1998, M1<M2<M3, there is an obvious trend that the 
more privatized the firm is, the higher proportion of legal person shares it has. M3 is 
usually 1.5 times as big as M2, and M2 is around twice as big as M1, this result is natural. 
After all, the first five biggest shareholders of most of the companies are state and legal 
persons, with the decline of state shares, legal person shares fulfill the vacancy. For FTA, 
generally, M1 is the lowest, M2 and M3 are quite close, and sometimes M2 is even 
slightly above M3. Results of Shanghai market are the same as all the samples, only for 
FTA, M2<M3, while in Shenzhen market, M2 is higher than M3 throughout the years, and 
the rest of the results are the same as that of all the samples. This corresponds to the result 
of previous hypotheses, which may be resulted from legal persons’ lack of interest to 
invest in the SRC companies and the relatively active individual investor group in 
Shenzhen market. To illustrate this, I find in 1998, on the whole, the mean of FLP in 
Shenzhen Exchange is 2 percents lower, while the mean of FTA is 1 percent higher than 
those in Shanghai Exchange. The turnover rate of Shanghai Exchange in 1996 and 1997 
                                                          




are 170% and 150%, while in the Shenzhen Exchange the figure are 290% and 210% 
respectively. 
Table 24: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on A1 over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
 
A1 AGE24 SIZE IND25
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -6.252 -4.07 -.426 -2.91 -2.19 -.07 63.62 29.66 40.74 
Sig. .00026 .000 .670 .004 .028 .944 .000 .000 .000 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
Mean rank 457.62 354.76 383.43 431.5 454.5 278.1 372.4 418.3 325.2
 
 
Table 25: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on A5 over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
A5 AGE SIZE IND 
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -6.93 -4.73 -1.35 -.594 -.095 -.602 68.4 39.98 42.76 
Sig. .000 .000 .179 .553 .924 .547 .000 .000 .000 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
Mean rank 463.23 349.2 402.59 412.4 447.7 232.4 333.3 443.8 370.9
 
 
Table 26: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on DIV over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
 
DIV AGE SIZE IND 
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -6.13 -3.87 -.161 -3.02 -2.53 -.081 64.6 30.99 40.84 
Sig. .000 .000 .872 .002 .011 .936 .000 .000 .000 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
Mean rank 456.59 355.78 382.52 432.4 455.4 279.8 369.1 414.7 323.4
                                                          
24 Age and SIZE are automatically recoded into two groups in the respective test, Group 1 includes 50 percent of the 
cases with smaller value, Group 2 includes the rest 50 percent with bigger value. 
25 IND is recoded into 5 groups, according to the 5 industries: manufacturing, commerce, real-estate, utilities and 
conglomerates, kruskal-Wallis test is used. 





Table 27: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on FST over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
FST AGE SIZE IND 
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -1.15 -.72 -.552 -2.26 -1.63 -1.79 21.46 11.2 14.52 
Sig. .251 .473 .581 .024 .102 .073 .000 .000 .000 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 





Table 28: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on FLP over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
  
FLP AGE SIZE IND 
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -.497 -.67 -.44 -3.01 -2.92 -2.19 16.26 11.65 16.86 
Sig. .619 .503 .660 .003 .004 .029 .003 .020 .002 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
Mean rank 410.09 401.94 432.29 382.8 391.1 390.4 390.3 402.5 477.7
 
 
Table 29: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on FTA over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
FTA AGE SIZE IND 
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -2.1 -2.43 -3.18 -4.93 -5.6 -.70 21.84 14.28 15.25 
Sig. .035 .015 .001 .000 .001 .487 .000 .006 .004 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
Mean rank 388.61 423.26 448.19 367.0 394.0 483.2 458.5 321.8 435.8
 
 
To analyze the effects of AGE, SIZE and IND may give more indications. Years since the 
companies listed (Age) has highly significant effects (at .000 level) on all the ownership 




the relationships are all negative. That is to say, companies listed later tend to have more 
concentrated and diversified ownership along with stronger control of the top shareholder. 
This shows though the top shareholder’s status has not been weakened, other big 
shareholders’ status has been strengthened as shown in descriptive analysis earlier. For the 
variables concerning ownership structure, there are no significant relationships between 
Age and FST or FLP. This means companies listed earlier do not necessarily have more 
state shares or less legal person shares than newly listed companies, since the policy of 
corporatization and public offering of SOEs is consistent. However, there is a significant 
positive relationship between Age and FTA, the longer the company is listed, the higher 
fraction of tradable A-share it has. This may be pushed by the market’s desire to embody 
more individual investors or may be the natural result of state’s giving up its right to buy 
in bonus.  
 
There are significant positive relationships between both Size and A1 and Size and DIV, 
this means in larger companies the top shareholder tends to hold more shares. And 
naturally, the ownership among the big shareholders is less diversified. There is no 
relationship between Size and A5, it shows the concentration degree has no difference 
between larger-sized companies and small companies. Size also has significant 
relationship with FST, FLP and FTA in recent years, it shows the state tends to control 
large-sized companies more firmly. This can explain why A1 increases along with the size, 
it may because the strengthened state control. On the other hand, A5 is not simply decided 





As for Industry (IND), industries have highly significant effects on all the variables. For 
A1, A5 and DIV, the two highest mean ranks are always manufacturing and utilities, and 
they also have the two highest state share fractions, lowest tradable A-shares fraction. This 
shows the state has a strong control in the companies engaging in manufacturing and 
utilities, which have robust top shareholders, high ownership concentration degree and 
less diversified shareholdings. The big institutional investors also crowd out individual 
investors. Commerce is the industry with the lowest A1, A5 and DIV, however, it has the 
third highest FST and the highest FTA. The low A1 may indicate the state shareholdings 
are not concentrated, instead, distributed to more state institutions and agents; the low A5 
and DIV and the highest FTA may illustrate legal persons’ lacking of enthusiasm to invest. 
Real-estate is also paid more attention by individual investors other than legal persons 
because it has the second lowest FLP mean rank and second highest FTA mean rank. 
Conglomerate has the smallest fraction of state shares and highest fraction of legal person 
shares, i.e. this industry is the most privatized. 
 
5.2 Corporate governance difference on the firm control 
Not all the variables regarding control are supported, generally the significance level 
increases along with the market development, year 1998 has the highest significance level 
on almost all the hypotheses, this may because I have the largest sample and a complete 








Table 30: Degree of privatization and ICD Statistics27
 
ICD Year 1998 Year 1997 Year 1996 Year 1995 
All samples G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 439.9 434.6 363.1 112.4 114.5 86.2 119.2 103.7 85.5    
Sig. .000 .005 .002  
Shanghai G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 233.0 238.3 182.6 55.1 39.6 33.1 62.8 49.7 43.2    
Sig. .000 .001 .012  
Shenzhen G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 207.2 199.4 179.9 59.4 75.4 52.8 58.3 54.0 42.1    
Sig. .088 .044 .041  
 
 
For hypothesis 5, of all the samples, because the Sif=0.0001< α, the insider control degree 
is significantly different across the groups with different privatization degree. On the 
whole, the gap between M1 and M2 is not as big as that of M2 and M3. Also, there is no 
single positive and negative relationship between insider control degree and privatization 
degree, though M2 is bigger than M3 all the time. There is one year M1 is lower than M2. 
Results of Shanghai market are highly significant in the last 2 years, results of Shenzhen 
market are less significant, and the situation of M1<M2 happens 1 out of 3 years in both 
markets. The reason why the Shanghai market has more significant result than Shenzhen 
market may because the former has more corporatized SOEs, they may have the legacy of 
more insiders from the original enterprises and stronger influence from the state on 
companies’ personnel appointments. And the result also shows the state’s influence on 
personnel administration in SRC group is no weaker than in SAC group. This proved our 
speculation: state continues to control the companies largely depends on the 
organizational system, which has not been fundamentally reformed.  
 
 
                                                          




Table 31: Degree of privatization and ICS Statistics28
 
ICS Year 1998 Year 1997 Year 1996 Year 1995 
All samples G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 406.2 474.9 364.0 94.7 121.2 99.3 110.4 107.8 90.7    
Sig. .000 .051 .072  
Shanghai G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 209.8 260.7 205.8 40.1 49.4 41.1 59.1 53.0 44.4    
Sig. .000 .373 .066  
Shenzhen G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 196.3 215.4 176.8 56.6 69.5 58.4 52.6 54.5 46.5    
Sig. .024 .288 .482  
 
For hypothesis 6, because the Sif=0.0001< α, the insider control degree is significantly 
different across the groups with different privatization degree. M3 is always the lowest, 
showing when state only has a weak control in the company, its influence on the personnel 
administration is also weak, and the companies tend to use more outsiders. Results of 
Shanghai market are more significant than those of Shenzhen market, and only the result 
in year 1998 of Shenzhen market is significant. There is no simple positive or negative 
relationship, of all the highly significant cases, M2 are much higher than M1 with no 
exception.  This shows when the state only has a relative control on the company, it is 
liable to arrange more insiders (most often personnel in the original SOEs) in the 
supervision committee as measures to balance power. While in companies in which the 






                                                          




Table 32: Degree of privatization and NPL Statistics29
 
NPL Year 1998 Year 1997 Year 1996 Year 1995 
All samples G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 174.4 163.8 138.9 45.9 45.1 40.3 48.2 46.3 48.9    
Sig. .002 .494 .916  
Shanghai G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 26 21.54 19.1          
Sig. .133    
Shenzhen G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 151.3 138.3 121.1          
Sig. .004    
 
 
For Hypothesis 7, because the Sif=0.002< α, the Party leaders' number on the Board is 
significantly different across the groups with different privatization degree of all the 
samples in year 1998. Before 1998, this information of most companies is not disclosed 
and included in the data sources, the insignificant results of the early years may because 
the very few available samples. There is a positive relationship between NPL and DPR as 
M1>M2>M3, indicating the more privatized the firm is, the less Party leaders will be on 
the Board. This still reflects state’s firmly controlling the personnel appointment. Results 
of Shanghai market are not as significant as those of Shenzhen market. The difference 














                                                          




Table 33: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on ICD over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
 
ICD AGE30 SIZE IND31
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -2.1 na na -1.02 -.902 -1.71 8.34 1.35 6.06 
Sig. .03332   .309 .367 .086 .080 .72 .158 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 








 Table 34: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on ICS over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
 
ICS AGE33 SIZE IND34
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -3.68 na na -1.2 -1.11 -2.42 38.84 1.51 7.56 
Sig. .000   .232 .266 .016 .000 .681 .109 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 










                                                          
30 Age and SIZE are automatically recoded into two groups in the respective test, Group 1 includes 50 percent of the 
cases with smaller value, Group 2 includes the rest 50 percent with bigger value. 
31 IND is recoded into 5 groups, according to the 5 industries: manufacturing, commerce, real-estate, utilities and 
conglomerates, kruskal-Wallis test is used. 
32 Numbers in parentheses show the Significance of the test.  
33 Age and SIZE are automatically recoded into two groups in the respective test, Group 1 includes 50 percent of the 
cases with smaller value, Group 2 includes the rest 50 percent with bigger value. 
34 IND is recoded into 5 groups, according to the 5 industries: manufacturing, commerce, real-estate, utilities and 




Table 35: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on NPL over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
 
NPL AGE35 SIZE IND36
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -2.21 na na -2.2 -.12 -.314 6.92 3.69 8.16 
Sig. .027   .028 .904 .753 .388 .297 .086 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 




Corporate control has no significant difference on the groups categorized by Age, Size and 
Industry, only the test in 1998 gives a few significant results. This may also because the 
problem of the incomplete data.  
 
From the test of 1998, on the test of Age, M1 of ICD and ISC are both bigger than M2, i.e. 
companies newly listed have higher insider control degree on the board and in the 
supervision committee. Since Age has no relationship with FST, this result is interpretable 
from the viewpoint of unreleased state control and corresponds with testing of hypotheses 
5 & 6. And for NPL, the result is significant with M1<M2, showing that companies listed 
earlier tend to have more Party leaders. This may indicate the actual function and status of 
the Party is not as so important as it was, nowadays, the state prefers arranging insiders to 
assigning Party leaders on the Board to control the organizational system. This may also 
explain why the sample size of NPL is small, since when introducing their managers, a 
                                                          
35 Age and SIZE are automatically recoded into two groups in the respective test, Group 1 includes 50 percent of the 
cases with smaller value, Group 2 includes the rest 50 percent with bigger value. 
36 IND is recoded into 5 groups, according to the 5 industries: manufacturing, commerce, real-estate, utilities and 




large part of companies only disclose the management positions of the directors, without 
mentioning their Party leader titles.  
 
There are no relationships between Size and ICD and Size and ISC, it shows insider 
control problem is prevalent in spite of companies’ size. The test for NPL is significant in 
1998 with M1<M2, indicating larger companies tend to have more Party leaders. It may 
be related to the higher FST of big companies, which are often corporatized from former 
SOEs. On one hand, these companies have bigger inertia to change the actual and nominal 
influence of the Party, on the other hand, the state tends to control the organizational 
system of bigger companies in which more state shares still remain.  
 
Industry has significant effect on both ICD and ISC, showing insider control degree varies 
from industry to industry. The mean rank sequence of ICD and ISC are quite consensus 
across industries. Commerce and manufacturing are the two industries that have the 
highest and the second highest ICD and ISC. Relate the high insider control degree in 
Commerce to the results of low ranks of A1, A5 and DIV and high FTA, I may conclude 
this is an industry with rather low management level and weak attraction to investors. 
Though the state has withdrawn from this industry to some extent, the inertia to improve 
management is big and the attraction to investors is weak. The high insider control degree 
in Manufacturing is consistent with its high FST rank. The mean ranks of other three 
industries are much less than these two and quite close to each other. NPL has no 
significant difference across industries, however, Commerce and Manufacturing still have 
the first and second highest number of Party leaders, which shows the continuing 




5.3 Corporate governance difference on incentives 
I are quite constrained in this bunch of tests because I only have data for reported annual 
salary (RAU) in 1998 and incomplete data for managerial shares (MGS) and the size of 
Supervision Committee (SSC), however, the result may still give us some insights.  
 
Table 36: Degree of privatization and RAU Statistics37
 
RAU Year 1998 Year 1997 Year 1996 Year 1995 
All samples G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 331.3 338.5 391 Na. na na na na na na na na 
Sig. .001 .494 .916  
Shanghai G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 173.4 189.0 206.3          
Sig. .043    
Shenzhen G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 158.1 149.5 185.1          




For hypothesis 8, because the Sif=0.001< α, the managers’ reported annual salary is 
significantly different across the groups with different privatization degree of all the 
samples in year 1998. There is a negative relationship between RAU and DPR, as 
M1<M2<M3, which shows directors of more privatized firms are likely to have higher 
reported salary than those in less privatized firms do. Results of Shanghai market are the 
same as that of all the samples. Results of Shenzhen market have a more significant result 
than Shanghai market because the gap between M2 and M3 is bigger in Shenzhen market. 
This is in line with our findings in descriptive analysis that Shenzhen market has the 
higher mean RAU and the highest RAU value. Strangely, M2 in Shenzhen market is lower 
than M1, i.e., managers in state absolute control companies get better pay than those in 
relative control ones, it may because of the state’s incentive strategy on managers.  
                                                          





Table 37: Degree of privatization and MGS Statistics38
 
MGS Year 1998 Year 1997 Year 1996 Year 1995 
All samples G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 360.2 380.3 423.9 100.2 93.4 105.0 95.8 98.9 105.3    
Sig. .002 .591 .581  
Shanghai G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 186.9 195.1 224.9 37.3 43.4 47.2 52.3 46.1 53.7    
Sig. .011 .255 .594  
Shenzhen G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 173.3 185.5 200.0 62.3 56.4 57.1 41.6 47.4 57.2    
Sig. .114 .702 .056  
 
For Hypothesis 9, because the Sif=0.002< α, the managerial shareholding is significantly 
different across the groups with different privatization degree of all the samples in year 
1998. There is a negative relationship between MGS and DPR, as M1<M2<M3. Managers 
in more privatized firms are likely to hold higher proportion of shares than managers in 
less privatized firms. Results from Shanghai and Shenzhen market have the same trend, 
but the former has more significant results. 
 
Table 38: Degree of privatization and SSC Statistics39
 
SSC Year 1998 Year 1997 Year 1996 Year 1995 
All samples G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 416.9 401.9 386.9 100.5 112.2 99.1 104.5 96.7 101.6    
Sig. .223 .435 .750  
Shanghai G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 223.9 204.0 200.5 40.8 41.3 46.0 51.0 45.5 55.1    
Sig. .170 .598 .408  
Shenzhen G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Mean 193.5 198.7 187.0 60.0 71.8 54.6 54.1 51.6 46.9    
Sig. .680 .119 .498  
 
For hypothesis 10, because the Sif=0.223> α, there is no significant relationship between 
SSC and DPR, it seems the structure of the Supervision Committee (ISC) counts more 
                                                          
38 Kruskal-Wallis Test 




than the size. Seen from this, most likely the Supervision Committees of SWC companies 
are also the tools of power balance, the underlying reason is its weak function and the 
purpose to settle the relationships with the various upper-departments. Results of Shanghai 
and Shenzhen market are the same. 
 
Table 39: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on RAU over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
 
RAU AGE40 SIZE IND41
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -6.36 na na -5.42 na na 55.83 na na 
Sig. .000   .000   .000   
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
Mean rank 313.9 412.78 321.4 405.8 390.5 355.8 364.6 436.6 263.7
 
 
Table 40: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on MGS over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
 
MGS AGE42 SIZE IND43
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -2.64 na na -2.73 -.45 -1.94 37.08 6.42 7.26 
Sig. .008   .006 .649 .052 .000 .093 .123 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 




                                                          
40 Age and SIZE are automatically recoded into two groups in the respective test, Group 1 includes 50 percent of the 
cases with smaller value, Group 2 includes the rest 50 percent with bigger value. 
41 IND is recoded into 5 groups, according to the 5 industries: manufacturing, commerce, real-estate, utilities and 
conglomerates, kruskal-Wallis test is used. 
42 Age and SIZE are automatically recoded into two groups in the respective test, Group 1 includes 50 percent of the 
cases with smaller value, Group 2 includes the rest 50 percent with bigger value. 
43 IND is recoded into 5 groups, according to the 5 industries: manufacturing, commerce, real-estate, utilities and 




Table 41: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on SSC over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
 
SSC AGE44 SIZE IND45
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -1.14 na na -1.61 -.57 -.195 8.51 .94 9.34 
Sig. .256   .108 .568 .845 .075 .817 .053 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
Mean rank 407.16 390.01 386.33 410.6 372 476.75 293.64 373.33 471.16
 
As for AGE, SIZE and IND, some of the results in 1998 are quite significant. Of which, 
RAU is sweepingly highly significant. 
 
Age has a highly significant effect on RAU, since M1<M2, the managers of companies 
listed earlier report higher salaries. As RAU is higher in more privatized companies, this 
again confirms SOEs are continuously listed throughout the years. The possible 
explanation is that a few years ago, the competition from managerial market is not so 
intense as today, mangers are better paid, and because of the “price rigidity”, the salary is 
hard to be cut down. Age also has a significant effect on MGS, with M1>M2, i.e. the 
newly listed companies have their managers hold more shares. This shows managerial 
shareholding, as an incentive measure, has been paid more and more attention during the 
reform process. It is in essence a kind of insider privatization. Age has no effect on SSC. 
No change in all the years itself is a sign, related to the real situation in China, I may 
conclude Supervision Committee is largely a decoration in most companies.  
                                                          
44 Age and SIZE are automatically recoded into two groups in the respective test, Group 1 includes 50 percent of the 
cases with smaller value, Group 2 includes the rest 50 percent with bigger value. 
45 IND is recoded into 5 groups, according to the 5 industries: manufacturing, commerce, real-estate, utilities and 




Size has highly significant result on RAU, with M1<M2, it shows that managers in bigger 
companies often are given higher salaries. The relationship between Size and MGS is also 
quite significant, with M1>M2, which shows managers in smaller companies tend to hold 
higher proportion of shares. I suppose it may be because a smaller MGS proportion in 
bigger companies means more shares. And in state controlling firms (often large 
companies), other compensation measures can fill the vacancy of managerial shares. SSC 
is not different on the basis of different size.  
 
Industry has a highly significant effect on RAU. The interesting thing is the two industries 
that have the first and second highest fraction of state shares, Manufacturing and Utilities, 
now rank the second and first highest reported annual salary. While Conglomerate, the 
most privatized industry, has the lowest mean rank of RAU, much lower than the other 4 
industries. It shows in the more privatized industry, the competition is more intensive, and 
their managers have to face the pressure from the managerial market. As a result, their 
salary will not be too high; while under the compensation system in less privatized 
industries, only if the managers have no big fault, their income is assured. MGS has highly 
significant difference across industries, Real-estate has the highest mean rank, followed by 
Utilities, Conglomerate, Commerce and Manufacturing. From this I may see some misled 
policy. Under the slogan of controlling the main line of the economy and withdraw from 
competitive industries, Utilities is the industry that the state is most reluctant to withdraw 
from, and since most of the competitive industries are included in the category of 
Manufacturing, it should has the highest MGS. However, the real situation is just the other 
way round. Companies in Utilities have the highest MGS while those in Manufacturing 




similar to bonus, while its function and influence of ownership transferring have been 
overlooked.   
 
Industry has a significant effect on SSC too. The mean ranks descend from Commerce, 
Conglomerate, Utilities, Manufacturing to Real-estate. The biggest SSC of Commerce is 
because of its low management level and the strong state influence remained. As for Real-
estate, it has the highest MGS (much higher than the rest), least FLP, second least FST 
and second highest FTA, compare to Conglomerate, it is more personally privatized than 
institutionally (legal person) privatized. Now that big-size Supervision Committee is a 
decoration, companies that are personally privatized really need not to expand its size.  
 
 
Part Two: The relationship between corporate governance and companies' 
performance 
The three variables concerning performance can be divided into two kinds. ROA and EPS 
are accounting ratios reported by the companies according to their book values, while 
MBR comprises share price, it emphasizes the market and investors’ evaluation. In a 
forward-looking market, prices of the firms incorporate the expectation of corporate 
governance’s effects on future firm performance. Also, MBR might reveal the real 
situation more objectively considering the somewhat problematic statistical data in China. 
On this concern, I rely on MBR more and use ROA and EPS as complementary indicators. 
I analyze the results of all the samples first, followed by the results from the two markets. 
This part of hypotheses are not based on three groups with different privatization degrees, 




Group 1 includes 50 percent of the cases with smaller value, Group2 includes the rest 50 
percent with bigger value. M1 and M2 represent the mean ranks of each group 
respectively. For this part of the hypotheses, since the causality is unclear, the 
interpretation of the results may be a bit difficult since alternative explanations can be 
provided. However, it still makes some sense and can be seen as a meaningful experiment.  
 
To analyze the influential variables first may help us find the underlying reasons of all the 
Mann-Whitney test results.  
 
Table 42: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on MBR over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
 
MBR AGE46 SIZE IND47
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -3.17 -7.86 -6.46 -11.86 -5.96 -4.77 9.5 19.56 10.68 
Sig. .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .050 .001 .30 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
Mean rank 416.61 365.42 488.75 297.2 380.3 367.8 423.2 378.0 440.0
 
Table 43: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on ROA over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
 
ROA AGE SIZE IND 
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -10.53 -13.11 -4.61 -3.89 -4.32 -3.03 37.09 29.19 9.18 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .057 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
Mean rank 493.4 320.1 440.1 376 409.87 328.21 266.31 529.8 424.17
                                                          
46 Age and SIZE are automatically recoded into two groups in the respective test, Group 1 includes 50 percent of the 
cases with smaller value, Group 2 includes the rest 50 percent with bigger value. 
47 IND is recoded into 5 groups, according to the 5 industries: manufacturing, commerce, real-estate, utilities and 




Table 44: Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on EPS over time in term of AGE, 
SIZE and IND and the Mean ranks of the test 
(All the samples) 
 
 
EPS AGE SIZE IND 
 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Z Score -8.84 -11.61 -3.46 -2.18 -2.18 -.209 22.41 18.97 14.31 
Sig. .000 .000 .001 .029 .029 .834 .000 .001 .006 
Mean Ranks of the test in year 1998 
 AGE SIZE IND 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
Mean rank 478.94 330.6 389.52 425.5 400.98 361.89 296.83 503.66 437.79
 
 
Age is highly significant on the performance variables, M1 is higher than M2 all the time, 
reflecting the quality of the newly listed companies is increasing and they do perform 
better than the companies listed earlier. Size has a highly significant effect on MBR and 
ROA, while the effect on EPS is less significant, for EPS is expressed as the profit divided 
by the book value of equity, it has a relative looser relationship with the variable of Size 
which is derived from assets. The MBR and ROA of M1>M2, suggesting a reported better 
performance and a higher market recognition for smaller companies. However, EPS 
indicates that larger-sized companies perform better as M1<M2. It may because larger 
companies have higher leverage ratios, when the asset is fixed, this means relatively less 
equities there will be. Thus EPS will be higher. Industry has a significant effect on the 
three variables, yet the mean rank sequences have big difference. Conglomerate and Real-
estate, the two most privatized industries, have the highest and second highest MBR, 
followed by Manufacturing, Utilities and Commerce. This indicates, the market thinks, the 
more privatized industries perform better. However, the mean rank sequences of ROA and 
EPS are not the same. The first one is Utilities, then Conglomerate, Manufacturing, 




recognized both by the market and the reports. The different ranks of Utilities and Real-
estate may comprise the effect of investors’ opportunism, but also reflect the partiality of 
the market.   
 
5.4 Performance difference on different ownership concentration and 
structure 
Table 45: A1 and Performance Statistics48
(All samples in 1998) 
A1 MBR ROA EPS 
All samples G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 407.4 375.3 -1.99 371.5 443.5 -4.37 382.4 431.7 -4.37 
Sig. .047 .000 .003 
Shanghai G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 214.1 203.9 -.859 191.3 227.7 -3.083 198.2 220.8 -1.92 
Sig. .390 .002 .055 
Shenzhen G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 192.2 173.2 -1.725 180.6 216.4 -3.108 184.2 211.9 -2.405
Sig. .084 .002 .016 
 
For hypothesis 11, of all the samples, the three indicators all give significant results, 
proving that different control degree of the biggest shareholder is related to the different 
performance. MBR has an increasing significance level, along with the market 
development, and only in 1998 it is significant. For ROA and EPS, M2 is higher than M1, 
while for MBR the case is opposite. That means according to companies’ reports, the 
more shares the biggest shareholder has, the better the performance. But the market gives 
higher values to the companies that have the biggest shareholder hold fewer shares. From 
this evidence, I may say that “one steersman controls the canoe” is not welcomed by the 
market, but it is easier for one shareholder to control the company, and in a transition 
economy, it may be a solution for the quick adapting to the environment. But possibility 




significant on all the indicators than Shenzhen market, implying the latter market may 
have a more keen sense on the effect of the top shareholder.  
Table 46: A5 and Performance Statistics49
(All samples in 1998) 
A5 MBR ROA EPS 
All samples G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 377.2 405.9 -1.78 374.0 441.1 -4.07 395.4 418.6 -1.4 
Sig. .075 .000 .159 
Shanghai G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 201.7 216.2 -1.227 193.3 225.7 -2.747 202.6 216.4 -1.169
Sig. .220 .006 .242 
Shenzhen G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 176.1 190.0 -1.264 180.9 216.2 -3.069 191.4 204.7 -1.158
Sig. .206 .002 .247 
 
For hypothesis 12, of all the samples, MBR and ROA have significant results, but EPS has 
not. Basically I may conclude that different concentration degree is related to the different 
performance. There is no exception that M2 is higher than M1, illustrating both the market 
and the financial reports admit that ownership concentration is related to better 
performance, when considering state shares and legal person shares all together. As EPS 
has no relationship with size, I infer that the effect of the ownership concentration is 
related to a company’s size. Results of Shanghai market and Shenzhen market have quite 
similar results to the result of all the samples. 
Table 47: DIV and Performance Statistics50
(All samples in 1998) 
DIV MBR ROA EPS 
All samples G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 406.0 376.7 -1.81 372.3 442.7 -4.27 383.7 430.4 -4.27 
Sig. .070 .000 .159 
Shanghai G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 214.4 203.7 -.906 191.3 227.7 -3.081 199.1 219.9 .078 
Sig. .365 .002 .078 
Shenzhen G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 189.9 175.7 -1.288 180.4 216.6 -3.15 180.4 216.6 -2.196
Sig. .198 .002 .028 
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For hypothesis 13, of all the samples, it is supported by the three indicators in 1998, i.e., 
ownership diversification of the biggest shareholders is related to different performance. 
However, this time the mean rank sequences are again different. Market values more 
diversified companies (lower DIV) higher, while the ROA and EPS both report companies 
that are less diversified tend to perform better. This accords with the result of hypothesis 
11 (A1), absolute state shareholding is hindering the diversification, the financial reports 
are controlled to support the top shareholders’ predominant shareholdings. Results of 
Shanghai market again has a less significant result than Shenzhen market, corresponding 
to the situation of (A1). It testifies that Shanghai market was not acutely aware of the 
influence of the diversification of ownership as Shenzhen market was, as shown in the 
descriptive analysis. 
 
Table 48: FLP and Performance Statistics51
(All samples in 1998) 
FLP MBR ROA EPS 
All samples G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 366.9 415.6 -3.02 402.0 413.1 -.67 406.4 407.6 -.08 
Sig. .003 .501 .938 
Shanghai G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 195.8 222.2 -2.237 201.0 218.0 -1.433 202.3 216.7 -1.213
Sig. .025 .152 .225 
Shenzhen G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 168.5 196.8 -2.557 201.3 195.7 -.485 204.5 191.6 -1.126
Sig. .011 .628 .260 
 
 
For hypothesis 14, of all the samples, MBR has highly significant result in 1998, with 
M1<M2. ROA and EPS have no significant results. It shows the market believes different 
proportions of legal person shares are related to different performance, the more, the better. 
These tallies with the relationship between Industry and MBR, Conglomerate has the 
                                                          




highest FLP, and its MBR ranks the highest among all the industries. On the other hand, 
performance reports do not acknowledge the function of legal persons. Result of Shanghai 
market is less significant than that of Shenzhen market on MBR, it shows legal persons 
are recognized to be more active in Shenzhen market than in Shanghai market.  
Table 49: FTA and Performance Statistics52
(All samples in 1998) 
FTA MBR ROA EPS 
All samples G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 403.9 379.3 -1.52 400.8 414.2 -.808 390.6 423.4 -1.99 
Sig. .128 .419 .047 
Shanghai G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 213.8 204.2 -.813 201.5 217.5 -1.358 198.2 220.8 -1.912
Sig. .416 .174 .056 
Shenzhen G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 192.4 173.9 -1.676 198.7 198.3 -.04 191.9 204.0 -1.052
Sig. .094 .968 .293 
 
For hypothesis 15, of all the samples, none of the indicators has significant result. 
Different proportion of tradable A-shares is not related to different performance. This 
shows not only individual investors have no strong influence inside the companies, but 
also the market treats them as not so important and decisive. However, this is also related 
to the too strong control rights of the biggest shareholder.  Results of Shenzhen market has 
a higher significant level than Shanghai market, resulted from its more active individual 
investor group.  
 
5.5 Performance difference on different firm control  
Again, in this and the next sections of tests, the data of 1997 and 1996 are incomplete.  
 
                                                          




Table 50: ICD and Performance Statistics53
(All samples in 1998) 
ICD MBR ROA EPS 
All samples G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 403.6 363.0 -2.54 393.2 404.5 -.692 369.3 400.6 -.266 
Sig. .011 .489 .791 
Shanghai G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 221.6 193.8 -2.537 202.3 213.6 -.961 204.6 211.3 -.575 
Sig. .018 .337 .565 
Shenzhen G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 181.0 170.7 -.948 189.0 194.1 -.456 187.9 194.1 -.55 
Sig. .343 .648 .582 
 
For hypothesis 16, of all the samples, MBR has a significant result in 1998 with M1>M2, 
ROA and EPS have no significant results. The market is beginning to realize that different 
insider control degree on Board has relationship with different performance. But the 
financial reports do not reflect this tendency. Result of Shanghai market on MBR is much 
more significant than that of Shenzhen market. It may indicate a more serious insider 
control problem in state controlling companies in Shanghai market, which has attracted 
the attention of investors.  
Table 51: ICS and Performance Statistics54
(All samples in 1998) 
ICS MBR ROA EPS 
All samples G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 408.2 354.4 -3.37 405.5 388.6 -1.04 414.4 378.8 -2.2 
Sig. .001 .301 .028 
Shanghai G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 216.7 197.0 -1.667 216.6 200.5 -1.189 220.9 193.3 -2.342
Sig. .096 .234 .019 
Shenzhen G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 188.4 159.9 -2.641 184.6 194.2 -.855 187.1 190.8 -.326 
Sig. .008 .393 .745 
 
 
For hypothesis 17, of all the samples, MBR and EPS have significant results, with 
M1>M2, ROA has not. The market has detected that companies with lower insider control 
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degree in supervision committee do perform better. This verifies that more outsiders are 
helpful for the management supervision and performance improvement. Results of  
Shenzhen market has a much more significant result than Shanghai market, implies 
Supervision Committees are more influential and effective in this market, of all the 
features, the insider control degree is quite important.  
 
Table 52: NPL and Performance Statistics55
(All samples in 1998) 
NPL MBR ROA EPS 
All samples G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 150.9 136.4 -1.46 165.5 139.2 -2.57 161.1 144.9 -1.59 
Sig. .144 .010 .113 
Shanghai G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 22.2 17.2 -.935 22.6 15 -1.402 22.2 17.2 -.935 
Sig.    
Shenzhen G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 128.6 114.3 -1.507 141.6 117.6 -2.442 139.3 121.7 -1.798
Sig. .132 .015 .072 
 
For hypothesis 18, of all the samples, MBR and EPS do not have significant results, only 
ROA has, with M1>M2, which shows less Party leaders will lead to better performance. It 
seems the market does not care how many Party leaders a company has. Generally, the 
market pays more attention on the proportion of insiders and outsiders, it does not take it 
for granted that Party leaders will necessarily have negative effects or to be helpful. What 
the market emphasizes is whether the managers are capable or not instead of their political 
features. Since ROA is related to Size, and as larger companies tend to have more Party 
leaders, this result may disclose the hope of having less Party leaders in large-size 
companies.  Results of Shanghai market and Shenzhen market are almost the same as that 
of all the samples.  
                                                          




 5.6 Performance difference on different incentives  
 
Table 53: RAU and Performance Statistics56
(All samples in 1998) 
RAU MBR ROA EPS 
All samples G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 349.7 346.3 -.23 367.3 359.7 -.49 350.9 375.4 -1.57 
Sig. .822 .626 .116 
Shanghai G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 196.1 189.9 -.55 190.0 197.0 -.61 182.7 204.3 -1.909
Sig. .582 .542 .056 
Shenzhen G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 152.6 158.2 -.55 174.9 166.1 -.833 168.0 171.9 -.366 
Sig. .582 .405 .714 
For hypothesis 19, of all the samples, no indicators have significant results. (i.e., different 
level of reported annual salary is not related to different performance). Relate to the earlier 
findings that mangers in more privatized firms which often have better performance are 
better paid and companies in more privatized industries pay their managers less and they 
perform better, I concur it is not the compensation mechanism that helps the performance 
improve. To change the organizational system is the more important task. It is a lesson 
that in a certain industry it is important for the formation of the payoff standard. And 
competition from managerial market will largely promote the performance improvement. 
Results from Shanghai market and Shenzhen market are the same. 
 Table 54: MGS and Performance Statistics57
(All samples in 1998) 
MGS MBR ROA EPS 
All samples G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 362.6 399 -2.29 358.8 434.6 -4.66 357.6 434.7 -4.74 
Sig. .022 .000 .000 
Shanghai G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 194.8 220.1 -2.144 184.0 213.9 -4.071 181.9 234.0 -4.421
Sig. .032 .000 .000 
Shenzhen G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 167.1 180.8 -1.273 175.1 203.6 -2.53 175.9 201.8 -2.307
Sig. .203 .011 .021 
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For hypothesis 20, of all the samples, the three indicators all have significant results with 
M1<M2, suggesting different level of managerial shareholding is related to different 
performance, the more managerial shares, the better the performance. In fact, this is 
another kind of insider privatization, to make the managers be more involved in the 
management and to relieve the principal-agent problem. The results of Shanghai market 
are more significant than Shenzhen market, it may because the managers are better paid in 
Shenzhen market, and the stimulation by managerial shares will not be so strong. Also 
Shenzhen market has more private capital, the representatives of the legal persons are the 
owners of the company, while in Shanghai market, managers in corporatized SOEs are 
appointed by the government, they will have nothing if they leave the position. Therefore, 
managerial shares are robust encourages to them.  
Table 55: SSC and Performance Statistics58
(All samples in 1998) 
SSC MBR ROA EPS 
All samples G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 108.3 96.3 -1.45 101.1 102.8 .843 108.2 96.43 -.154 
Sig. .004 .064 .033 
Shanghai G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 221.7 196.0 -2.174 216.8 200.8 -1.354 213.8 203.3 -.888 
Sig. .004 .064 .033 
Shenzhen G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score G1 G2 Z score
Mean 186.7 165.2 -1.992 198.6 184.1 -1.278 203.13 179.1 -2.127
Sig. .046 .201 .033 
 
For hypothesis 21, of all the samples, MBR and EPS have highly significant results with 
M1>M2, suggesting different size of supervision committee is related to different 
performance, the smaller, the better. ROA has less significant result, which is in line with 
the less significant result on ISC, generally, ROA is not very sensitive to the supervision 
system as MBR and EPS are. And the result also suggests the effective Supervision 
                                                          




Committees are tend to be small, over-sized supervision committees are liable to be a 





















Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary of findings 
Based on the data analysis, I obtain a better understanding of the relationship between 
privatization and corporate governance development of China’s listed firms as well as the 
relationship between corporate governance and firms’ performance. 
  
Generally, there are significant differences of the ownership concentration and ownership 
structure among the company groups with different privatization degree. Generally, the 
less privatized the company is, the higher control rights the top shareholder has, the higher 
the ownership concentration is and the less ownership diversification among the biggest 
shareholders is. The less privatized the firm is, the less fraction of legal person shares and 
tradable A-shares it will have. State over-interference and principal-agent problem exist as 
the “one steersman controls the canoe” is prevalent. Market favors companies with lower 
biggest shareholder control right, higher concentration degree, more diversified ownership 
and more legal person shareholders. However, the result also unveils that even if the 
company is under state’s relative control, legal persons may still lack motivation to be 
more involved in company management because of State’s traditional and systematic 
control advantage. Individual investors still have no decisive influence on companies’ 
management. I also find the information from financial reports is sometimes different 
from the recognition of the market, especially on the aspects concerning the biggest 
shareholder (A1 and DIV), reflecting the unwillingness of state’s further withdraw and the 





I find some significant difference on companies’ control across groups with different 
privatization degree. The less privatized the firm is, the higher insider control degree on 
the Board and in Supervision Committee it will be, and the more Party leaders it will have 
on the board. This shows the state still firmly controls the organizational mechanism, such 
as the appointment and dismissing of the managers, even when it only has a relative 
control. And the degree of insider control does affect the companies’ performance, as the 
market is becoming more and more aware of this. It is recognized the higher the insider 
control degree, the poorer the performance. What the market emphasizes is the difference 
between insiders and outsiders. Over-sized insiders are not thought to be helpful for 
companies’ management. Whether the directors are Party leaders is not the focus of the 
market. The market has separated the titles of the Party leaders and the positions of the 
managers, thinking Party control has nothing to do with the management of the company. 
It is a good sign. However, the companies themselves seem to be reluctant to have Party 
leaders on the board, though they do not admit insiders will affect performance. It may 
because more Party leaders on the board usually means more interference shall be posed 
on the firm and more goals other than economic ones shall be required.  
 
I also find some difference on the aspect of incentive mechanism across the company 
groups with different degree of privatization. The less privatized firms tend to have lower 
salary for managers. This supports why managers in SOEs are first risk repulse, then risk 
favorite. However, reported annual salary is not related to companies’ performance at all. 
The incentive of the managers in state controlling firms still has not been spurred. 




less managerial shares too, and the difference of managerial shares does relate to 
companies’ performance. This is a new approach for the incentive measures to solve the 
principal-agent problem, to let managers’ interest accord with shareholders’ interest. I find 
no difference on the size of the Supervision Committee among the groups, but smaller-
size Supervision Committee seems to lead to better performance.  
 
To compare Shanghai market and Shenzhen market, generally, the top shareholder in 
Shanghai market has stronger control over the companies, and the ownership of the big 
shareholders is less diversified than those in Shenzhen market. Correspondingly, legal 
persons and individual investors of the former are not as active as those in Shenzhen 
market, the insider control problem in more serious in the latter. Shanghai market is not so 
sensitive to the problem of ownership diversification and insider control as Shenzhen 
market is.  The managers are relatively better paid in Shenzhen market than in Shanghai 
market, it maybe the reason why the effect of managerial shares in the former is not as 
robust as that in the latter market.  
 
Age, Size and Industry have strong influence on almost all the variables. Results support 
stock market is an efficient vehicle for the building of “Modern Enterprises System”. 
SOEs are continuously listed, with an increasing stronger control from the state and 
improved management. The ownership of the firms newly listed tends to be more 
diversified as well as concentrated. They have more insiders and less Party leaders, lower 
reported annual salary of the CEOs and more managerial shares. The competition has been 




increased largely, and they perform better according to both market recognition and 
financial reports.  
 
Also, I see the government’s effort on carrying out the policy of “grab the big and loose 
the small”. Bigger firms tend to have more state shares, stronger top shareholders, and less 
diversified ownership. Accordingly, the organizational system is still controlled by the 
state. CEOs in bigger firms are better paid, but they have less managerial shares. On the 
whole, they perform worse than smaller-size firms.   
 
I also find the different situation of companies’ corporate governance and performance in 
different industries after privatization. Industries that are least privatized, such as Utilities 
and Manufacturing have the highest level of the biggest shareholder control rights, 
concentration level and lowest diversification degree. They also have the highest reported 
annual salary too. But besides the most poorly managed industry Commerce, they are two 
industries that poorly performed according to the market’s standard. Though according to 
the financial reports, they rank quite high. Conglomerate is the industry most privatized, it 
has the lowest reported annual salary but the best performance recognized by the market, 
followed by the most personally privatized industry Real-estate. I notice that though CEOs 
are better paid in bigger firms, which are tend to be more state controlled, CEOs in more 
privatized firms still have a higher RAU mean value than that in less privatized firms. For 






6.2 Experiences and lessons 
Generally, China’s reform has curbed SOEs’ deteriorating situation, regained the 
competitiveness of the state capital, prevented big draining and loss of state capital and 
achieved the objective of “Grab the big, loose the small” and re-energized 1000 big and 
medium size firms. (See table 56) A lot of experiences and lessons can be summarized as 
an example for these countries. 
 
Table 56: SOEs’ output from 1995-199959
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 
% of fixed asset investment growth in SOEs 14.8 8.8 13.9 5.1 
SOEs’ Industrial output growth (%) 16.59 13.10 10.75 11.58 
individual Economy growth (%) 20.00 15.38 14.70 14.35 
Other economy growth (%) 23.77 30.18 25.29 27.6 
Net profit of profitable SOEs and State 
shareholding companies 
-378.04 -403.12 525.14 997.86 
 
First, to reform gradually rather than a “Big Bang” is a decision that fits China’s real 
situation. The reform process follows the route of restructuring—corporatization—
privatization. Compound restructuring program has been tested in China, however, not 
until the property rights was touched, the government over-interference and principal-
agent problem was relieved. Following restructuring, corporatization is the preparation for 
privatization. The corporatization process itself will largely promote efficiency, as it is a 
process of reallocation of resources and a principal change of corporate governance. The 
corporatization and the listing process in China, not only promote the corporate 
                                                          




governance reform in the companies, but also nurture a very promising investor group. 
Since the state invites the legal persons to be the shareholders, and legal persons are more 
motivated and capable in managing the companies as acknowledged by the market, to 
privatize institutionally may be better than large-scale personal privatization, which helps 
the post privatization management and performance improvement. But all in all, practice 
and theory illuminate that corporatization is not enough, privatization is in need to 
separate governmental and business functions and constrain principal-agent problem.  
 
Second, it is vital to develop the stock market and to use the stock market as the vehicle 
for SOE reform. The advantages of this approach are obvious: 1) It brings about the 
function of the market, which has the most objective and sensitive view in evaluating the 
ownership, further, the corporate governance and performance of the companies. And the 
market is the most powerful supervisor on companies’ management. 2) Public offering is 
an approach to attract other types of investors and privatize state assets without having a 
big social and economic shock. Various types of investors and capital are attracted and 
nurtured in the market, besides money, their management expertise and investment 
concepts are especially crucial for the reform, since they are the parties state assets are 
privatized to. 3) To use stock market and public offering is especially suitable for a mixed 
ownership in transition economies when the government is unwilling or unable to accept 
the full divestment. In some countries there may not be enough small shareholders capable 
of buying into the firm and there is no single indigenous buyer with sufficient resources to 
buy the enterprise outright, more importantly, there are strategic and political 
considerations. Currently, foreign investors are prohibited from China’s domestic market, 




flushes into China, it requires the segmented markets to become a united market. It is very 
possible foreign investors will step into the A-share market as shareholding parties of the 
legal persons at the beginning and expand their shares gradually. Meanwhile, the state 
may continue to be the majority shareholder in selected or strategic enterprises in the 
context of its industrial policy. But by and by, mixed ownership should be diluted, 
because the prospect of mixed ownership may serve to reduce the amount the value of the 
shares because the market’s suspicion that the government will try to use the firm for its 
own ends. 
 
Third, further privatization should be carried on. 1) In some competitive industries, the 
state may withdraw and allow institutional and personal investors come in. Except a few 
leading and strategic industries, the state has no need to step in these industries. 2) I find 
that state shareholding tends to have comprehensive effects on the corporate governance 
of the company, which has a big influence on companies’ performance. But in fact, higher 
asset values could come with passive minority state ownership. Also, when the ownership 
is diversified and other parties hold approximately same small fraction of shares, the state 
does not have to hold more than 50% of the shares to have a relative control. It is a 
process of resource allocation optimization. 3) In China, there is no precedence that the 
government holds “golden share” in some SOEs, these may be a token of 1% share, but 
gives state a controlling voice. As what happened in Singapore, the Singapore government 
gave up its “golden share” in Singtel, but still has one in MRD because it involves mass 
rapid/public transport. With limited sources of the government, this may be feasible, but 
since it gives privileges to the government, it should be limited to very few companies and 




and privileges than other parties. It should compete fairly and enforce its control according 
to its shareholding without muffling other shareholders’ voices. The state should not be 
over-represented on the board, and the governmental and administrative means of asset 
management should be changed. The government’s role must become that of an 
institutional investor. 
 
Fourth, industry structure can be optimized through public listing. Public listing and stock 
market development are big opportunities for the government to reallocate the resources 
besides the consideration of saving the SOEs. As the designer of the industrial policy, 
when the state chooses the listed companies, it must consider their industry distribution, as 
it is a robust signal of state’s industry policy. China was not very successful on this aspect. 
For example, many commercial firms are listed with low management level, some firms in 
traditional industries such as textile, bicycles are listed, and they gathered a sum of money 
from the market but still cannot improve their performance. The state has realized and 
started adjusting.  
 
Fifth, corporate governance of the firms should be further reformed. In China, the 
fundamental attributes of the modern corporate form are not yet well established, though 
early steps have been made in the right direction. 1) Of all the aspects, the most important 
aspects are ownership concentration and ownership diversification. More mature legal 
persons and individual investors have to be nurtured and supported by the policy, state 
should further withdraw from competitive industries. Even when a few shareholders 
control the majority sum of shares of the company, their control rights can be quite evenly 




some control mechanism should exist to balance the expanding control rights of the 
insiders. In the past, China used the organizational system to control the personnel, 
however, the representatives of the state assets under this institutional setting are still to be 
found somewhere in the government hierarchy. The policies should encourage the 
participation of independent professional managers, bring the functions of General 
meeting and Supervision Committee into play, to lower the insider control degree and 
strengthen supervision. 3) There is a clear consensus worldwide that all of the most 
successful corporate governance systems are centered on the judicious use of market-
based incentives. The various incentives should have better alignment with market 
principles and more rapid, systematic implementation. Compensation mechanism merely 
by salary may not be a very useful incentive measure to promote managers in transition 
economies, though governmental control is overtly harmful. Managerial shares through 
stock options may be tested to bind managers’ interest to the interest of the firms. 
Managerial market should be developed and to lead in competition.  
 
Sixth, on three aspects China can offer experiences to other transition economies that have 
to privatize from scratch like China did. 1) To begin with, commercialize and corporative 
the firms introduce corporate governance into these firms, introduce modern accounting 
and auditing system into the management. 2) As there is no ready market of investors and 
funds, no legal and corporate structures and institutions in those economies, to build 
capital market including stock market is one of the most important policies. They should 
bring legal framework such as company law and stock market law into force, meanwhile, 
cultivate and regulate the firms in the meantime of corporatization. 3) Instead of 




public offering, introduce other parties’ investors in the firms’ ownership and management 
and reinforce the corporate governance. 4) The government needs to educate investors and 
strengthen the discipline of the market, build long-term investment perspective instead of 
gambling.  
 
6.3 Policy implications 
I gather the following policy implications based on the findings: 
 
First, State shares should be further withdrawn. 
More privatized firms and more privatized industries have better performance than the less 
privatized one, which has been recognized by the market. Large proportion of state shares 
leads to 1) the bad industry structure. The capital from the state staying in the traditional 
industries such as textile, machinery and building materials and common competitive 
industries, such as Commerce, is diversified and ineffective. 2) State shares are not 
tradable, hindering the upgrading of resource allocation and the fair competition of 
shareholders through the financial market.  3) The absolute control of the top shareholder 
usually comes with its abuse of control right. 4) It is the root of subsequent control and 
incentive issues and the serious principal-agent problem. Besides the strategic 
consideration of controlling the polar industries of the economy, the state should withdraw 
from competitive industries and lead in competition. This policy is overtly declared on the 
Fourth meeting of Fifteenth Party’s Conference in 1998. The proportion of state shares is 
planned to decrease to 51% at the first step from the current 62%. In 1999, there are 65 




the state is no longer the biggest shareholder in 53 companies. Most of those companies 
are in competitive industries. 
 
The state can transfer its shares to other entities by means of ownership deducting contract, 
repurchase and proportional sale. By the first means, the state gives some of its shares to 
other shareholders or the parent companies, by receiving a few compensations as a symbol. 
The other two can be used in the cases in which the proportion of state shares is rather 
high, state can cash some assets from the repurchase and proportional sale, companies’ 
ownership structure and asset quality will be improved too.  The company can reach the 
goal by the means of cash repurchase (i.e. by cash or by gathering capital from the market, 
e.g. issuing new shares) and asset repurchase. That is, to change the ownership of 
nonproductive assets or ill assets in proportional sale, one way is to sell state shares 
proportionately to tradable A-share holders, setting a price at which the transaction is 
more profitable for the company, the total amount of capital will not be affected too. The 
other way is to compress a few shares into one share to decrease the amount of state 
shares. These methods have been tested, further development of the measures and policy 
regulations are needed.  
 
Second, the high concentration degree of the companies is often related to the too high 
shareholding of the top shareholder, especially when the state has an absolute control. 
Along with the withdrawing of state shares, both the decrease of ownership concentration 
and increase of diversification of the biggest shareholders should be promoted. As shown 
by the market, this is related to better performance. This is also important for the nurturing 




of legal persons will largely solve the ownership concentration and diversification 
problem and bring in competition, as evidenced by the industry of Conglomerate. Besides 
the state’s stepping out of competitive industries, to activate legal person investors 
depends on: 1) the reform of new stock issuance system. 2) Equal shares have equal rights, 
no special treatment should be given to the state. State representatives should not be 
overstaffed on the Board, and they have no higher status than other shareholders. 3) In 
addition to the role as the owners of legal person shares, legal persons can also invest in 
tradable A-shares. Under the original system, a large amount of money is used for the 
bidding of new stocks for the purpose of speculation. The issuance mechanism reform will 
compel some money turn to invest in this market. 4) In China, there are already 22 
investment funds, with a market value reaching 50 billion yuan, most of them are close 
funds. More open funds, pension funds and insurance companies should be brought into 
the market. 5) Relative control of the owners may be encouraged. For example, except in a 
few industries or fields, if the shareholding of the top shareholder exceeds 5 times of the 
second biggest shareholder’s holding, the company may be sent a notice for ownership 
optimization, as a signal to the market to urge the company to improve its ownership 
structure.  
 
Third, to reform corporate governance in the companies, insider control degree on the 
board and in the Supervision Committee should be decreased. The result of hypotheses 
testing reflects that the market has realized the value of more outsiders’ participation. 
Those independent directors on Board and personnel in Supervision Committee bring 
expertise, unbiased judgement and fair supervision. And the nature of the Supervision 




and experienced on supervision. In China’s market, the conception of independent 
directors has been initially accepted. Other than outside directors, independent directors 
have no ownership in the listed companies and have no other positions in the company. 
The number of the outside directors and independent directors should be required in the 
regulation of listed companies. Other requirements may include that temporary General 
Meeting of shareholders can be hold on the proposal of a certain number of independent 
directors, independent directors can report to the General Meeting and related departments, 
etc.  
 
Fourth, the function of the Party should gradually be separated from the management of 
the companies. Since the state now is only a shareholder of the company, it is only 
responsible for the shares from the angle of the owner. The Party organization is not an 
institution that is higher than the Board or CEOs, choosing and appointing of managers 
should depend on the standard of performance. The function of the labor union should be 
separated from the Party too.  
 
Fifth, the old compensation system is not effective at all. Competition should be led in 
from the managerial labor market to challenge the managers in state controlling firms. 
Now the directors on the Board and personnel in Supervision Committee in the New 
Listing Regulation of the two markets are required to promise on the responsibilities and 
declare on their shareholding, training, other positions and experience. Also, managers 
should be responsible for the loss of state assets according to the loss amount. And the 
incentive measures should combine the interest of the managers to that of shareholders, 




time welfare, the arrangement should largely rely on stock options. Stock option should 
cover more beneficiaries, including important employees who have big contribution to the 
company. Since the leadership of the Party reflects in its supervision to the managers and 
to the Party organizations, whether the Party leaders should be included in the stock 
options needs further consideration. Also, a part of state shares can be used as resources of 
stock options, as an approach of the state withdrawal and incentive measures for managers 
in state controlling companies.  
 
Sixth, in the process of privatization, the original social security and safety net have been 
reformed, including unemployment welfare, retirement and medical care. However, the 
social insurance system still needs time to develop, individual insurance is not well 
accepted by the people just came out of a Central planned economy. The new privatized 
firms will have to take this aspect into consideration somehow.  
 
6.4 Limitation of the study and further research 
The biggest constraint of the research is the availability of the data. It brings the following 
limitation into the research:  
 
First, because only data of the listed companies are accessible and clean because of public 
supervision, I have to confine our empirical study in the limitation of listed companies. 
This means I have to be cautious when applying the results. Second, the accounting 
standard was not unified before 1995, the legal framework kept changing, and the 




Thus to a large extent I can only do comparison year by year. Third, in the developing 
market, many regulations and requirements are set out along with the market development. 
This means some of the data is incomplete. e.g. CSRC at first did not require the 
disclosure the introduction of the directors, thus, I cannot exactly decide whether a 
director is an insider. Also, Even the annual reports did not disclose the number of Party 
leaders (NPL) for a large part of the listed companies, no other available sources can be 
found. In early years, annual salary system is not commonly used, and the revenue of the 
managers is not required to disclose, as a result, only the data for RAU in 1998 is 
available. Fourth, because some of the accounting data are not so accurate or even are 
forged, and the statistical caliber of some variables is not accurately unified, which may 
lead to problematic records in data mining, and result in diverted conclusion. 
 
For this study, I only did test year by year, a time-series study can be done if the data is 
complete. And I only test the relationship between corporate governance and performance, 
degree of privatization and corporate governance separately. Further research may try to 
test the relationship between the degree of privatization and performance more directly 
and precisely from the angle of corporate governance. Also, this study uses non-
parametric test, it only can find out the correlation of the variables, further research may 
try to use more accurate methods and search for the causality between the variables if the 
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Trading Summary for stocks (1995-1997) 1         
 
    Stock Exchange                   Shanghai                                   Shenzhen                                Total 
          Items                  1995        1996      1997        1995         1996        1997      1995        1996      1997  
 
   No. of listed  
     companies              188           293         383          135         237         362          323         530        745 
 
   Total Issued 
      Capital  2               498.25      670.82    975.37      267.38   439.54    795.85    765.63   1110.36   1771.22 
       A-shares              436.6       625.54    907.76      240.48    399.47    38.37     704.08    1025.01  1646.13 
       B-shares              34.65        45.28      67.61          26.9      40.06      57.48    61.55       85.34      125.09 
 
   Negotiable shares3   129.85      186.59     285.56    105.13    158.76    275.06    234.98    345.35    560.62 
       A-shares               95.2          141.3     217.95     83.78      125.77     225.3     178.98    267.07     443.25 
       B-shares              24.65         45.28      67.61       21.35      32.99      49.76       46          78.27      117.37 
 
    Total Market  
    Capitalization 4        2525.66  5477.81  9218.07   948.62  4364.57   8311.17  3474.28  9842.38  17529.24 
       A-shares              2433.71  5316.13  9032.45   876.86  4132.42   8121.74  3310.57  9448.55 17154.19 
       B-shares               91.95      161.68    185.61     71.75    232.14    189.43      163.7    393.82    375.04 
 
    Negotiable Market   587      1408.74    2513.47    351.22   1458.29  2690.95    938.22    2867.03  5204.42 
    Capitalization  5        
       A-shares              495.05   1247.06    2327.86   295.89   1266.95   2528.22   790.94   2514.01   4856.08 
       B-shares               91.95    161.68       185.61     55.33    191.33      162.72    147.28     353.01   348.33 
 
    Total turnover 6       3103.48  9114.81  13763.18  932.99 12217.35 16958.66 4036.47 21332.16 30721.84 
       A-shares              3102.63  9020.24  13550.24  915.95 12032.05 16744.97 4018.58 21052.29 30295.21 
       B-shares               60.85     94.57      212.94       17.03      185.03    213.69     77.88    279.87   426.63 
 
    Trading volume7      51399  110188   121645.4   19148.06 143126   134433.7  70547.06 253314 256079 
       A-shares              49450   107400    116601.2  18656.67 139092.7 130528.6  68107  246493   247130 
       B-shares               1949      2788      5044.16      491.38    4033.35   3905.1      2440     6821      8949 
 
         
                                                
 






                                                          
1 Source: China securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook, 1998; Yearbook of Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock exchange. 
2 Unit: 100 million shares 
3 Unit: 100 million shares 
4 Unit: 100 million yuan 
5 Unit: 100 million yuan 
6 Unit: 100 million yuan 




Changes of listed Companies by Shares Categories in Recent years (National)8
                                                       
            Year                          1990         1991         1992         1993        1994        1995       1996       1997 
                 A-shares 
            Issuance only             10           14              35            140            227         242          431         627   
 
                 A & H 
           shares issuance            0             0                0               3                6            11            14           17 
 
                 A & B 
          shares issuance             0             0                18            34             54            58             69          76 
 
               B-shares 
           Issuance only              0             0                0               6               4             12            16            25 
 
                 Total                    10           14              53            183            291         323           530         745   
 
              A-Shares  
               in total                   10           14              53             177           287         311          514          720 
 
             B-shares 






Numbers of Listed Companies by Stock Capital (1997.12.31)9
 
             Stock Capital           Shanghai Stock Exchange     Shenzhen Stock Exchange      National 
 
        Below 100 mil. Yuan                   82                                    89                                          171 
 
        Below 200 mil. &  
        Above 100 mil. Yuan                 166                                   141                                         307 
 
        Below 300 mil. &  
        Above 200 mil. Yuan                  64                                     63                                          127 
 
        Below 400 mil. &  
        Above 300 mil. Yuan                  19                                     32                                           51 
 
        Above 400 mil. Yuan                  52                                     37                                           89 
 








                                                          
8 Source: China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook, 1998 
9 Source: China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook, 1998 
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Appendix 4 
Capital Structure Figures (1993-1997)10
 
                                                                                                        Unit: 100 mil. Shares( facevalue: 1 yuan) 
                     Year                                        1993               1994               1995             1996               1997 
 
Nonnegotiable shares                              279.85              458.5             546.96          789.69          1271.19 
 
Sponsor’s legal person shares                   229.28             377.86            475.69           671.63         1078.24 
 
   State shares                                            190.22             296.47            328.67           432.01          612.28 
     
   Domestics Legal Person shares              34.97               73.87             135.18           224.63          439.91 
 
   Foreign Legal Person shares                   4.09                 7.52               11.84             14.99            26.07 
 
Private placement of Legal  
Person shares                                            41.06               72.82              61.93             91.82            130.4 
 
Staff shares                                                9.32                 6.72                3.07              14.64            39.62 
 
Others                                                        0.19                  1.1                 6.27              11.6              22.87 
 
Negotiable shares                                  107.88             226.04             301.46          429.85           671.44 
 
A-shares                                                    61.34             143.76             179.94           267.32           442.68 
 
B-shares                                                     24.7               41.46               56.52             78.65            117.31 
 
H-shares                                                    21.84              40.82                 65                83.88            111.45 
 























                                                          





                                                                                       
               Year               Overall Retail Price Index                    Overall Consumer Price Index of Residents 
                                              Last year=100                                                     Last year=100 
 
              1990                            102.1                                                                    103.1 
 
              1991                            102.9                                                                    103.4 
  
              1992                            105.4                                                                    106.4 
 
              1993                            113.2                                                                    114.7 
  
              1994                            121.7                                                                    121.4 
 
              1995                            114.8                                                                    117.1 
 
              1996                            106.1                                                                    108.3 
 
              1997                            100.8                                                                    102.8 
 
    
 
 
                                                          
11 Source: China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook, 1998 
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Figure 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Research Model                                                                                                                                                                                      
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